Introduction
Thomas Aquinas connects virtues with an end in mind. The focus of a human being’s end or purpose points toward one of the most probing questions: What is the meaning of life? Here, Thomas’ first answer is the same as Aristotle’s: happiness and attainable in this life. It is what humans strive for. Yet, Thomas proposes the possibility of perfect happiness as the final end of man, going above the imperfect happiness of Aristotle’s theory.[1] Thomas supports Aristotle’s conception of happiness as the greatest form of happiness attainable in this mortal life but also argues that the desire for perfect happiness is inherently present in man’s essential nature and that all of man’s acts are ultimately directed towards the attainment of perfect happiness, not some imperfect substitute.[2] In following Augustine, Thomas defined “virtue.” as a habit in action.[3] This definition does not apply to every kind of virtue. Nevertheless, he used it to capture the essence of what he thought is the most essential for happiness.[4] The following paper will present some exegetical points from the first five questions on “Man’s Last End” in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae (ST), along with a limited overview of Thomas’ virtues and how they connect to happiness.
Man’s Good Perfect End and Practical Virtue
Beginning the Prima Secundae of the Summa, Thomas explains that; “the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore, all human actions must be for an end.”[5] The “end” is his conception of the enjoyment of the beatific vision by the worthy soul through the means of its intellectual, volitional, and appetite capacities. [6] When the corruptible body has decayed, and the intelligible and immortal soul exists in a state of separation. The needs and desires of the appetitive parts of the soul disappear (imperfect happiness or bliss), with only intellectual desires remaining to be satisfied with the beatific vision or perfect happiness.[7] Therefore, the will operates through desire toward the “perfect good” that the “last end has nothing is left besides it to desire.” [8] Thus, for man, there exists “naturally one last end,” and this “intelligent volitional, individual creature (human) must be fixed on one last end.”[9]
This ultimate end is connected through human actions such as virtue with the rational volitional activity of the soul. This is primarily linked to practical intellectual virtue (prudentia or φρόνηση) that leads to the truth “by which we live righteously”[10] And which cannot be misused as a practical virtue expressed by wisdom, which Aquinas defined as “right reason of things as done.” [11] Practical wisdom involves “good deliberation through the means toward a good end, a correct judgment and doing, by the execution of that good choice.”[12] It also perfects the intellect through its practical activities and cannot be misused for evil purposes when it is closely connected with the moral virtues.
This ultimate end is connected through human actions such as virtue with the rational volitional activity of the soul. This is primarily linked to practical intellectual virtue (prudentia or φρόνηση) that leads to the truth “by which we live righteously”[10] And which cannot be misused as a practical virtue expressed by wisdom, which Aquinas defined as “right reason of things as done.” [11] Practical wisdom involves “good deliberation through the means toward a good end, a correct judgment and doing, by the execution of that good choice.”[12] It also perfects the intellect through its practical activities and cannot be misused for evil purposes when it is closely connected with the moral virtues.
Therefore, it is evident that nothing can satisfy man’s will, except what is perfectly good. Perfect happiness entirely satisfies one’s desire in eternity; otherwise, it would not be the ultimate end. This is found, not in any creature, but in God alone, as every creature participates in goodness. Therefore, God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of the Psalms 102:5, “Who alone satisfies your desire with good things.” Therefore, God alone constitutes man’s happiness.[13] Yet, here is an important distinction, for it is God the “Who” must also take the place of the “which”; understood as “the means.” As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. I, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake.” But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake. Therefore “happiness consists of no good of the soul.” [14] By his process of eliminating all the other answers, Thomas finds himself left with God alone.
Good Imperfect Means
Thomas proves next that it must be just one last or final end of everything we do, and that we cannot have more than one final end. It is disputed, then… “<that> one will <would be> directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends.” Thomas states the last or final end is presented in two ways: 1) The last end as the point of convergence as an essential concept and 2) considering the thing where the aspect of the last end is realized as diverse. Next, since all human desire or appetite looks for a fulfillment, “a perfection,” and it is precisely in this fulfillment where the last end is located, a common nature is realized. [15] However, the means in which “the thing” is realized, as all humans may not agree to it as to their last end. “… [since] some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else.” Such is the divergence, at least as a possible way of confusing the means over the ultimate end. Here imperfect human happiness as it stands understood by Thomas fully emerges.
Furthermore, he also introduces the imperfect happiness in two other ways: a general and a specific notion. According to the general notion of happiness, he argues for the convergence in the last end. Yet here, Thomas sets ups the reality of this perpetual divergent direction expressed through the means of varying human actions while presupposing Aristotle’s dictum that “all men seek happiness” or “the good.” [16] In saying that humanity has two ends, as when (1) a miser desires money as an end, and (2) then possesses the money and enjoys it, Thomas still keeps in mind the true last end.[17] In another way, man’s last end is sought through something created and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of imperfect happiness.
Again, this may appear as two ends, but that the first is taken up into the last, as it is merely “the attainment or enjoyment of it,” which explains the divergence. So, it is impossible for any created good to constitute a human’s ultimate happiness. It would seem that for Thomas, while people may dabble in mediate “ends” of created goods, these are “participated goods or ends” only in as much as they point to, or partake in, the final or ultimate end in God. Indeed for Thomas “nature tends to one thing only,” [18] which, as an “uncreated good.” Thomas maintains this pursuit to establish “imperfect happiness” and highlight what “natural.” really is – here on earth – as being different than Aristotle, who viewed happiness depending on the actualization of one’s “natural faculties.”
Again, this may appear as two ends, but that the first is taken up into the last, as it is merely “the attainment or enjoyment of it,” which explains the divergence. So, it is impossible for any created good to constitute a human’s ultimate happiness. It would seem that for Thomas, while people may dabble in mediate “ends” of created goods, these are “participated goods or ends” only in as much as they point to, or partake in, the final or ultimate end in God. Indeed for Thomas “nature tends to one thing only,” [18] which, as an “uncreated good.” Thomas maintains this pursuit to establish “imperfect happiness” and highlight what “natural.” really is – here on earth – as being different than Aristotle, who viewed happiness depending on the actualization of one’s “natural faculties.”
Nature and Grace
While virtues are practiced in this life, what does “natural” really mean for Thomas?[19] Does his famous dictum “grace perfecting nature”[20] mean more than saving grace as humanity’s “natural” and the final end? It seems that Thomas tones down the pessimistic view of human nature expressed by Augustine, including the doctrine of Original Sin. As Thomas writes, “Human Nature is not so completely corrupted by sin as to be totally lacking in natural goodness.”[21] Humans may have an impulse that seeks God, but yes, other stronger desires that pull them down to worldly pleasures. So it may be possible to begin the process of redirecting this upward action in this lifetime by exercising the natural virtues that Aristotle talks about—the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, justice, friendship, etc. Then, how is this impulse really understood “naturally” and is this confirming man’s pursuit of happiness? Possibly, by the eight candidates in question 2, which are wealth, honors, fame or glory, power, bodily good or health, pleasure, good of the soul and virtue, by any created good at all, in other words, everything in the whole “natural” world. Thomas takes these candidates one by one: for happiness, it cannot be wealth, because wealth exists only for the sake of something else that one might acquire with it.[22] It cannot be honor, because honor accrues to someone merely as a consequence of realizing some good, and thus cannot itself be an ultimate good. [23] For similar reasons, it cannot be fame or glory either, which are, in any case, often achieved for things that are not really good in the first place. [24] Neither can it be power, for power is a means rather than an end and might be used to bring about evil rather than genuine good.[25] It cannot be a pleasure, because pleasure is also a consequence of realizing a good rather than the realization of a good itself. It cannot consist of any material good of any other sort. But neither can even it be a good of the soul, since the soul, as a created thing, exists for the sake of something else (i.e., that which creates it).[26] That is not to deny that wealth, honor, fame, power, pleasure, and the goods of body and soul cannot have their place in this imperfect world; for they cannot fail to do so, given the sort of creatures that humans are. Thomas’ point is that such earthly happiness can’t be the highest or ultimate good for humans, that to which every other good is subordinated. God alone can only be that ultimate good.
As stated previously for Thomas, there is a sharp distinction between enjoyment and happiness. Enjoyment pertains to worldly goods and physical pleasures: but these tend to be very short-lived imperfect happiness, yet not connected to an ultimate end but rather pure enjoyment. Today, Thomas would point to the experience of many wealthy people and celebrities as evidence for this truth. Despite having every worldly good—fine foods, cars, houses, vacations, friends, family—many of them remain deeply unhappy, even spiraling into the misery of drugs and suicide. Thomas would explain this as follows: when every enjoyment is felt, the soul begins to crave for something more than mere pleasure. But if one has no knowledge of this “something more” or doesn’t know how to go about finding this, the enjoyment turns to pain and suffering. This also explains why we see a lot of billionaires suddenly change towards the middle or end of their lives: that nagging feeling that there is something more results in charitable work or an orientation to a higher purpose in life. W. Norris Clarke puts such earthly realities into a “graced” perspective:
The real beings in our universe go out of themselves in action for two reasons: one, because they are reduced, in that as limited and imperfect they are seeking completion of themselves from other beings; two, because they are rich, in that they actually exist and so possess some degree of actual perfection and have an intrinsic tendency to share this in some way with others. Why this should, in fact, be so is, or Should indeed be, a source of wonder for the metaphysician. Without it, of course, there would be no universe. But it seems the ultimate reason is that it is the very nature of God himself to be self-communicative love, and since all other real beings are in some way images, participating in the divine goodness, they all bear the mark within them, according to the nature of each, of this divine attribute.[27]
Humans are made happy in satisfying their natural desires, but can a human’s natural desire reach out to a good outside oneself in surpassing a human’s capacity? Thomas seems to deny such a premise. Like Augustine, Thomas would probably say that God has made humans for Himself and that is why human hearts are “restless until they rest in Him”[28] and thus allow the imperfect earthly good in virtue its potentiality toward the act. There is within humans an inherent dissatisfaction of anything less than God and an inherent desire for only God. Thomas integrates this desire into a passion for a moral life as a good and necessary property, but not as the first cause. For Thomas, that “our hearts are restless” belongs to the “grace” of creation and human nature, but that “they find their rest in thee” is a matter of the necessity of gratuitous saving grace.
Grace and Nature
While “pure nature” is given meaning both through imperfect happiness and humanity’s pursuit of a supernatural end through virtue, the gratuity of saving grace emerges as a crucial distinction. Henri de Lubac seems to provides an example of such grace, from first to last, comprehensive:
However, “natural,” however real it may be, the desire for the vision of God is in no case what determines God’s actually giving the vision. God is not governed by our desire. The relationship between the two things must, in fact, be the opposite one: it is the free will of the giver which awakens the desire. This is incontestable. There can be no question of anything being due to the creature.[29]
This observation of “the free will of the giver which awakens desire,” essentially, points to the relationship between nature and grace as everything is grace, from first to last. But for Thomas in the very act of creation itself, God has given as a gracious gift. Even more, Thomas begins his in-depth exploration of nature and grace with the assertion that all human knowledge and will is predicated on God’s own prior action: “no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God.”[30] Thomas describes in imagery this subtle distinction in comparing saving grace with natural knowledge.
The material sun sheds its light outside us, but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God’s enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge, and for this, there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge. [31]
Therefore, “for knowledge of any truth whatsoever, human beings need divine help, so that the intellect may be moved by God to its act.”[32] In affirming humanity’s supernatural end, Thomas can hold together a paradox that “grace perfects nature” and the natural desire whereby life itself is graced with a longing for the beatific vision as the only fitting end of human nature.[33]
In Thomas’ synthesis of Aristotle, how does saving grace take part? By an infusion from God by His grace, which has now revealed to us three additional virtues: those of faith, love (Charity), and hope. These virtues pull a human through to the final end. Humans, made in the image of God and demonstrating a moral life, showing a capacity to be self-governing, to freely and deliberately guide himself/herself toward God as his final goal. Using all the wisdom available to him/her, whether natural or supernatural. Such morality is not a morality of obedience to the law, in the sense of obedience to particular precepts imposed explicitly from without. Still, a virtue of the free self-governing person, responsibly guiding oneself towards God as the final goal, following the natural law imprinted in the person’s very nature by God. Thus, the totally virtuous moral person who “does good and avoids evil”[34] Is in creative harmony with his/her own nature. The final way nature is graced. Nevertheless, the reality of life and the pursuit of happiness provide criteria for Thomas to locate the true and final moral dignity of man in redemption. Such natural standards Thomas forged with special revelation. Significantly, the need for saving grace, and this vital infusion is affirmed and eloquently argued in the last part of the Prima Secundae of the Summa. [35]
Working Out of Virtue
So how is intellect moved to act of pure and perfect blessedness? Through the action of practicing a virtuous life. “Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam.” Here “perfect virtue” is introduced as the practiced means to the blessed ends where the object is God himself. The implied movement toward this now becomes clear “happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.”[36] “Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing, and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous.”[37] Here, potentiality is for the sake of action and its actual fulfillment of something virtuous, therefore, potentiality in itself cannot be the last end for the soul itself. For the last end is situated in the act of the first or final cause, the object of God. This seeking is created as imperfect human happiness, an operation, an action. For this, operating happiness has its ends in a human's supreme perfection. “Now, each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently, happiness must consist in man's last act.” [38] Thomas referral to Augustine seals the matter; “Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; "Those things are to be enjoyed, which make us happy.” Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.[39] The question then arises, how is this imperfect happiness created? This is found in virtue. The practice of virtue is an operation in the “now.” Therefore, virtue provides happiness in this present life, and its immanent sense is a taste of perfection to come, yet is it presently satisfying? Surely; “…but in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless, it is a participation of happiness…. Consequently, the active life, which is busy with many things, has less happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one word, i.e., the contemplation of truth.”[40] Here, the crucial practice of virtue initiated in the reason demonstrates a contemplative “act” on God, now and forever.
Happiness’s final perfection and imperfect happiness being separated yet related provide further information regarding virtue’s operation. Besides being a signifier, imperfect happiness contains clarifying distinctions: “according to as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness.”[41] Here Thomas significantly modifies Aristotle with biblical revelation; “Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. I, 10), We call men happy, but only as men. But God has promised us perfect happiness when we shall be as the angels in heaven (Matthew 22:30).”[42] Here, the practice of virtue remedies this earthly life, yet still, the question arises which virtue? Or is it the virtue of rational practice, contemplation? “Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e., the contemplation of truth.” [43]
Rational Virtue
The highest faculty the human being possesses is ratio, from which it follows that humans can achieve happiness in this life in proportion to the level of truth accessible to ratio for comprehension. As Thomas writes in Summa Contra Gentiles:
Man’s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth, for this operation is specific to man and is shared with no other animals. Also, it is not directed to any other end since the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake. Besides, in this operation man is united to higher beings (substances) since this is the only human operation that is carried out both by God and by the separate substances (angels).[44]
Man’s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth, for this operation is specific to man and is shared with no other animals. Also, it is not directed to any other end since the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake. Besides, in this operation man is united to higher beings (substances) since this is the only human operation that is carried out both by God and by the separate substances (angels).[44]
The practice of happiness already possesses, being drawn toward its end and precisely through the means of method engaging the intellect in the core of the contemplative life. Does this mean that the perfect beatitude reciprocally produces a created good in action? To answer this question, the underlying metaphysics is essential: the “prime mover” of Aristotle is the revealed goodness in the act, God, the perfect good in being, and pure act. But the essence of beatitude, that is, a human’s potential in achieving and enjoying the last end, is earthly and consequently, something created.[45] This activity or act moves toward the perfect beatitude constituting a human’s highest perfection, and “perfection implies act, as potency implies imperfection.”[46] Here, the earthly potency of the rational human intellect is central for the very object of beatitude and does not reside in goods or benefits of the body. Still, it surely includes these earthly goods for their potency toward the act. Etienne Gilson states:
This notion of beatitude, transcending humankind and nature, has not been trumped up to harmonize morality with religion. There are an informal agreement and continuity of order between the earthly happiness accessible here below and the heavenly beatitude to which we are called. The last end is not the negation of our human ends; on the contrary, it gathers them together by sublimating them. Human ends are in their turn but partial imitations of our last end and imperfect substitutes for it. … Thus Thomism continues nature into super-nature. When it has described the total human being, and not merely the human soul, as the immediate object of philosophy, it goes on to deal with the destiny not only of the human soul but of the whole human being. For Aquinas, the Christian's beatitude is the beatitude of the whole person.[47]
Therefore, the object of man’s appetite is the perfect good, just as the object of the intellect is the perfect true. For Thomas, this is the reasonable justification of his answer to the voice that asked him in the middle of the night in the chapel what he wanted as his reward: “Only yourself, Lord.” His logic and his life coincide perfectly.[48] Thomas’s use of special revelation makes it all the more poignant; “the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:24): So run that you may comprehend [Douay: obtain].” But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (2 Timothy 4:7-8): “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice.” Therefore obtaining is necessary for Happiness.[49]
Theological Virtues and their Connections
While the moral virtues and practical wisdom are necessary for imperfect happiness, Thomas denied that they are sufficient for the perfect happiness that consists in beholding the vision of God in heaven. The rational contemplative life is a bridge toward this final end. Here, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity take their place. [50] The virtue of faith, which perfects the intellect, concerns those truths about God that the intellect assents to “by means of Divine light.” [51] Thomas defined “faith” as “a habit of mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”[52] The virtue of hope, which perfects the will, concerns the movement of the will toward perfect, eternal happiness as an end that is, by God’s help, attainable. [53] The virtue of charity, which also perfects the will, concerns the love and friendship uniting the human being to God. [54] The theological virtues, like the infused moral virtues, are habits that fully embody Augustine’s definition of virtue as “habits in action.”[55] Finally, just as the moral virtues and practical wisdom are interconnected, the infused moral virtues are interconnected with charity. Moreover, Thomas argued that when God infuses charity into the person, He infuses all of the other moral virtues as well. The virtue of charity is central in showing how grace perfects nature. This illustrates how the imperfect beatitude receives from God in such a virtuous practice and action:
Charity loves God, above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things since He is the beginning and the end of natural good, whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of the beatitude, and since man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover, charity adds to natural love a certain quickness and joy, in the same way, that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.[56]
Therefore, charity adds to natural love to possess the moral virtues in higher practice in their fullest sense, a person also needs to perform the practical wisdom of the intellect. But given the numerous virtues that Thomas discussed, is charity really so crucial concerning the others? Thomas’ answer starts from the following principle: “for any two virtues, the more excellent virtue has a more excellent object.”[57] Hence, of all of the intellectual virtues, wisdom is the most important because its object is God toward perfect happiness/bliss–is the most excellent object of knowledge.[58] Of all of the moral virtues, justice is the most important because its object – the operations whereby people interact with each other – is the most excellent.[59] Of the three kinds of virtues – intellectual, moral, and theological, the theological are the greatest because they have as their object in God. Finally, of the three theological virtues, charity is the most important because it unites the human being to God. Hence, charity, “the mother and form of all the virtues,” is undoubtedly the most important of virtue of all in terms of imperfect happiness and eternal bliss.[60]
Conclusion
For Thomas, the attainment of the beatific vision is rooted in the virtuous exercise of human rational activity of the soul. For the beatific vision is attained by the merit of virtue, and thus, following Aristotle’s original principles, constitutes the highest rational activity of the soul rooted in virtue. It is shown how the contemplation of this object causes happiness in the subject; for it perfectly satisfies every intellectual desire, in a situation where bodily desires are absent. [61] It is continual, for the activity of contemplating the divine essence is eternal. It is genuinely self- sufficient because it is not dependent upon unstable external factors once it is attained it is held in secure stability without the risk of its loss in the future.[62] It is with this model that Thomas proposes the possibility of genuinely perfect happiness as the final end of man, above the imperfect happiness of Aristotle’s Theory. However, Thomas supports Aristotle’s conception of imperfect happiness as the highest form of happiness attainable in this life, but also argues in following Augustine, that the desire for perfect happiness is inherently present in man’s essential nature, and that all of man’s acts are ultimately directed towards the attainment of perfect happiness, not some imperfect substitute.
[1] Aristotle’s dictum: “all men seek happiness” from the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents a theory of ethics based on a teleological account of human nature, according to which the moral value of human conduct is understood concerning the fulfillment of man’s final end.
[2] St Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard Book IV, Distinction 49, “on beatitude,” ad. Q. 4., “Can we attain to bliss in this life?” – “So Aristotle gives his opinion about bliss or happiness, namely, that bliss to be perfect must last forever without changing, but human beings can’t achieve perfect bliss [but can only] imitate it a little And to that extent, be called blissful... But this view seems unreasonable. For all agree that happiness or bliss is a good of rational or intellectual natures and so wherever such natures truly exist, not by imitation, we should find true Bliss and not just an imitation of it. Human beings do not simply echo understanding... but are truly rational and intellectual; so we must believe that they can sometimes attain true bliss and not simply an imitation of it; for otherwise, the natural desire of their intellectual nature would have no function.”
[3] ST I-II 55. 4 In its strictest meaning, however, as used by moral philosophers and theologians, it signifies a habit superadded to a faculty of the soul, disposing of it to elicit with readiness acts conformable to our rational nature. "Virtue," says Augustine "is a good habit consonant with our nature." From Saint Thomas's entire Question on the essence of virtue may be gathered his brief but the complete definition of virtue: "habitus operativus bonus," an operative habit essentially good, as distinguished from vice, an operative habit essentially evil. See- Catholic Encyclopedia Online - http://www.newadvent.org
[4] ST I-II 55. 1
[5] ST I-II 1.1 Reply to Objection 2. If any human action is the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways: first because it is commanded by the will, e.g., to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance, the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently, it follows that if human action is the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.
[6] ST Supplementum Tertiæ Partis 92.1
[7] ST I-II 4.5-8
[8] ST I-II. 1.5
[9] Ibid
[10] ST I-II 57. 4
[11] Ibid
[12] ST I-II 57. 4-6; also see II-II, qq. 47-49, 51.
[13] ST I-II 1.8
[14] ST I-II 2.7
[15] ST I-II 5.8
[16] ST I-II 1.7
[17] ST I-II 1.8 Cf. also I-II 94. 2
[18] ST I-II 1.5
[19] This debate is very much alive in Thomistic studies. For examples of the appeal to pure nature, see Guy Mansini “Henri de Lubac, the natural desire to see God, and pure nature.” In Gregorianum, 83 no. 1 (2002):107, and Eugene A. Te Selle, Jr., “The Problem of Nature and Grace” in The Journal of Religion, 45 no. 3 (Jul. 1965).
[20] ST I 1.8
[21] ibid
[22] ST I-II 2.1
[23] ST I-II 2.2
[24] ST I-II 2.3
[25] ST I-II 2.4
[26] ST I-II 2.5-7
[27] Clarke, Norris. W. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001. P. 33
[28] Confessions of St. Augustine (Book I, Chapter 1)
[29] Lubac de, Henri. The Mystery of the Supernatural. Trans. Rosemary Sheed and intro. By David L. Schindler. NY: Crossroad, 1998. 207.
[30] ST I-II 109. 1
[31] ST I-II 109. 1-2
[32] ibid
[33] My understanding of Thomas’s paradox seeks to keep the following in mind: the gratuity of God’s free act in Christ, the relation between creation and salvation, the understanding of human nature and its the proper end, and the place of human desire for the good and transcendent.
[34] ST I 5
[35] ST I-II 109. 5, obj. 3, ad 3. “While the desire for the final and ultimate good—which can only be the vision of God—is “natural” to the creational human being as such and a gracious gift of creational grace, the fulfillment of that desire depends entirely on divine freedom and gratuitous salvific grace.” In a particular article in his section on the nature of grace, Thomas refers back to his discussion here of natural endowments and final ends. Here the objection and Thomas’s reply must stand together: Obj. 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may men attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments without grace.” Reply to Obj. 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher-end, which lower natures can in nowise reach.
[36] ST I-II 3.2
[37] ST I-II 3.1
[38] ST I-II 3.2
[39] ST I-II 3.1
[40] ibid
[41] ST I-II 3. 2 ad. 4
[42] ibid
[43] Ibid
[44] SCG 3. 37
[45] ST I-II. 3.1
[46] ST I-II. 3.2
[47]E. Gilson. Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas A translation of LE THOMISME Sixth and final edition by Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES pg.405
[48] Inspired by G.K. Chesterton’s biography on Thomas
[49] ST I-II 4.3
[50] ST I-II 62. 1 These virtues are called ‘theological.’ because (1) their object is God, (2) they are infused in humans by God, and (3) they are made known to humans only by Divine Revelation in the Holy Scriptures.
[51] ST I-II 62.3
[52] ST II-II 4.1-2
[53] ST I-II 62.3; also II-II 17. 1-2.
[54] ibid; also II-II 23. 1
[55] ST I-II 55.4; 65.2
[56] ST I-II 109.3
[57] ST I-II 61. ad 2-3 Of the four cardinal virtues, practical wisdom is the greatest because its subject–the intellect–is higher than the subjects of the other cardinal virtues (ST I-II 66.3, ad 3).
[58] ST I-II 66.5
[59] ST I-II 66.4. Another reason why justice is higher than the other moral virtues is that it perfects the will.
[60] ST I-II 66.6
[61] ST Ia 10. 1–3, “On the Eternity of God.”
see also SCG III. 25, “man naturally desires to know the first cause as his ultimate end... it is not a knowledge of just any an intelligible thing which suffices for human happiness, which is the ultimate the end, but divine knowledge, which terminates natural desire as its ultimate End... Aristotle agrees with this judgment in the final book of the Ethics where he says that man’s happiness is speculative, that is, speculation bearing on the best speculable object.”
[62] ST I-II 5.4 “Can happiness once had to be lost?.... if we are speaking of the imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, then it can be lost, and this is clear in contemplative happiness, as when lost either through forgetfulness, or because of illness, or even by other occupations that wholly distract one from contemplation... But if we are speaking of the perfect happiness that is expected after this life... true happiness requires that a man have certain knowledge that he will have it and never lose it.” Ad. 1., “It should be said that happiness is a consummate perfection which excludes any defect in the blessed. Therefore it comes to the one having it without mutability, acting by divine power, which elevates man to participation in an eternity transcending all change.”
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, Father of the English Dominican Province, trans., vols. I-V (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981).
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, Kindle Edition
Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa contra Gentiles. Book Three, Providence, (Part 1 and Part 2) Translated by Vernon Bourke; Notre Dame, Ind.: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1975.
Augustine. Confessions
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian. Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005.
Catholic Encyclopedia Online - http://www.newadvent.org
Chesterton, G.K. St. Thomas Aquinas, Kindle Edition
Clarke, Norris. W. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.
Davies, Brian The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992)
Drefcinski, Shane. A Very Short Primer on St. Thomas Aquinas’ Account of the Various Virtues, University of Wisconsin–Platteville http://www.uwplatt.edu/~drefcins/233AquinasVirtues.html
de Lubac, Henri. The Mystery of the Supernatural. Trans. Rosemary Sheed and intro. By David L. Schindler. NY: Crossroad, 1998.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald (2012-07-19). Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. Kindle Edition.
Gilson, Etienne. Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas A translation of LE THOMISME Sixth and final edition by Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES.
Kreeft, Peter. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Boston College Course guide ©2009 by Recorded Books, LLC
Mansini, Guy. “Henri de Lubac, the natural desire to see God, and pure nature.” In Gregorianum, 83 no 1 (2002), 89-109.
Te Selle, Eugene A. “The Problem of Nature and Grace.” In The Journal of Religion, 45 no. 3 (Jul. 1965), 238-249.
