Johannes Eckhart von Hochheim, commonly known as Meister Eckhart, at least from his discovered writings, did not treat Peter Lombard’s Sentences Book I Distinction 44 (d. 44) on the question “if God could create a better world or in a better way”. His existent corpus has accumulated in the critical edition of his Lateinishe Werke (LW) begun in 1936, and includes an introduction from his Sentences comment, yet no trace of d. 44 is documented. Still, a possibility exists where one is able to speculate and formulate on how Eckhart would approach d. 44.
In probing such a question as possibly articulated, the Meister’s thought demands a close reading. Eckhart’s understanding of a ‘better world’ is fixed on God, and depends on the human individual to grasp the “optimum datum” bestowed upon the human creature. By taking traditional doctrine, including Thomas’ metaphysical thought, he dialectically went beyond the necessary distinction of God’s transcendence and immanence by collapsing ‘participation’ into an unconventional perspective of space and time. Why? Perhaps, he was driven by the perceived spiritual need of the people. Because Eckhart the Preacher as ‘practical’ theologian was profoundly shaped by the opportunity of ‘speculative’ thought as a highly educated Dominican at Cologne and Paris.
As a respected leader within the relatively young Order, Eckhart helped to expand it in the Teutonic Provinces while he idiosyncratically interacted with the theology of Albert and Thomas, perhaps affirming and seeking to move the discussion further. His logical method and use of Scripture produced an unconventional metaphysical thought mostly ignored at the University of Paris, but eventually confronted by the Roman Catholic Church later in his career. Eckhart’s preaching caused his texts to be examined and he defended them as Professor Walter Senner OP continues to trace. The following presents components of his thought that could shape on how Eckhart ‘could have’ commented on d. 44.
Eckhart’s Sentences Commentary status as ‘un-discovered’ provides evidence of its originality from an initial fragment.These are notes presented as lector sententiarum sketching the direction his comment would take. His verse of the successive comment is: “Altissimus creavit de terra medicinam”. At this advanced stage of Eckhart’s career at Paris, a novel direction about God’s omnipotence is evident.
Alessandra BECCARISI states:
In commenting on the word “Altissimus”, Eckhart quotes, as does Richard, the first verse of Siracides (Ecclesiasticus): Altitudinem caeli qui dimensus est? [Who can measure the height of the Heavens?]. Then: Unus est altissimus, creator omnium omnipotens [The one is the highest, the omnipotent creator of all things]. Eckhart interprets Altitudinem caeli in order to demonstrate that the cosmos, though immense, is nevertheless measurable, as the calculations of the astronomer Alfraganus and the Jewish doctor Moses Maimonides demonstrate. He thus contrasts the exactness and measurability of the cosmos with the indeterminate and incommensurable nature of God. Thus, already in this first work, the contrast arises between finite and infinite, between the quiddity of created beings and the simple being of God. For, though no one can measure the breadth of the sky, it is nevertheless determinate and measurable. The one, according to Eckhart, refers to the simplicity of God, which is contrasted with the created or formally inherent being (“esse hoc et hoc”). Here, for the first time, appears a famous Eckhartian claim which distinguishes the created as “esse hoc et hoc” from God, who is “ipsum esse”.
In commenting on the word “Altissimus”, Eckhart quotes, as does Richard, the first verse of Siracides (Ecclesiasticus): Altitudinem caeli qui dimensus est? [Who can measure the height of the Heavens?]. Then: Unus est altissimus, creator omnium omnipotens [The one is the highest, the omnipotent creator of all things]. Eckhart interprets Altitudinem caeli in order to demonstrate that the cosmos, though immense, is nevertheless measurable, as the calculations of the astronomer Alfraganus and the Jewish doctor Moses Maimonides demonstrate. He thus contrasts the exactness and measurability of the cosmos with the indeterminate and incommensurable nature of God. Thus, already in this first work, the contrast arises between finite and infinite, between the quiddity of created beings and the simple being of God. For, though no one can measure the breadth of the sky, it is nevertheless determinate and measurable. The one, according to Eckhart, refers to the simplicity of God, which is contrasted with the created or formally inherent being (“esse hoc et hoc”). Here, for the first time, appears a famous Eckhartian claim which distinguishes the created as “esse hoc et hoc” from God, who is “ipsum esse”.
Such a distinguished claim highlights Eckhart’s use of the Neoplatonic tradition and the German Dominican direction initiated by Albert the Great concerning the distinction of ‘ipsum esse and esse hoc et hoc’. Here Eckhart makes a subtle statement of creation’s immensity, as creation is not said to be infinite, rather created as finite, more precisely and for contrasting purposes it holds the infinite God who is ‘beyond eternity’. God is eternal and dissimilar, certainly, but then again emphatically totally ‘other’ but integral within creation. It appears ‘pantheistic’ prima facie, or a superficial interaction with his work, but the metaphysical complexity and distinctions of Eckhart’s method comprise a system of explaining the intellectus in a most radical way, not out of the ordinary for a Dominican in the generations following Thomas.
This is demonstrated in comment on the Expositio libri Exodi, in affirming Thomas on ‘how God knows from eternity’ with a scripture from Micah 4:5: “We walk in the name of the Lord our God forever and beyond that”.This comment from his Opus expositionum is filled, on one hand, with a presentation on the incommunicable attributes of God, but merges the obvious Creator — creature difference by emphasizing the ‘similar’ finding its locus in his understanding of creation. Eckhart’s radical metaphysics of the intellectus grants the basis for his theological emphasis between the intersection of God and humankind, a ‘collapsed immanence with transcendence’ that takes one to ponder, the ‘spark of God’ in the soul of rational human individual.However, for such a move, Eckhart’s reframing of time and space grants its opportunity for the human species from the perspective of the Eternal. Behind this comment, the Aristotelian terms of ‘substance and accident’ aid toward its perennial discussion of the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ begun in Greek philosophy and utilized in Christian theology.
Obviously, such a Sentences comment could be lost due to many factors, including the censuring of such articulated thought from his collective works through the Papal Bull: In agro Domino by John XXII. This censure of selected texts called out Eckhart’s metaphysical system as heretical on 15 points and the remaining 13 as highly questionable. So it is helpful to form the right questions on how a comment on a ‘better world’ may have transpired. The major point of the first three articles censured concern Eckhart’s implication of ‘the eternity of the world’, a clear line crossed by its condemnation from the bishop of Paris in 1277 and something Eckhart was certainly aware of as a student during its aftermath. Eckhart seemed to disregard this heresy before his inquisitors who had no interest for such speculation. Another central point is the Trinitarian generation as eternal, ‘the Father begetting the Son’. However, this will be omitted from an analysis here, notwithstanding its importance as intricately linked to how Eckhart interprets ‘In the Beginning’ among other posits that will be presented. Eckhart the theologian is creative in his use of the philosophic tradition, incisive in his readings of the auctoritates and bold in positing subtle interpretations of Augustine and Boethius.
It is argued as an open question based on provocative ideas concerning human spiritual potentiality seemingly oblivious to the reality of human sin as I understand the doctrine. In this regard, Eckhart employs his nuanced statements on space and time in his interpretative use of the verse 17 from the epistle of James from the Vulgate: “Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.” Here the question of ‘better world” in the hic et nunc and with all its possibility not just being ‘good’ or even ‘better, but the ‘best’! — yet for the sake of affirming an absolute omnipotent God. Where a ‘world with a free human individual’ combined with the fact of ‘omne datum optimum’ to the creature who would know no spiritual limits. This ‘optimum’ is found throughout his most mature comment on scripture, the Gospel of John. However, its foundational posit is that Eckhart did not simply dwell on the human individual as his starting point. The human ‘subject’ (in a modern sense) is presented as the human ‘object’ of God’s omnipotence.
Peter Lombard’s Sentences’ Book I, d. 44 is the last of a triad of distinctions exploring God’s omnipotence. Eckhart affirms God’s omnipotence throughout his writings. In 2010, Father Senner found a manuscript from the library at Troyes, France which contains fragments of arguments used in responses from other Masters on such a foundational affirmation. These fragments could very well be utilized as counter or supporting arguments in various disputed questions. As Eckhart conceives it, this must be interpreted in ‘existential’ terms: Let God be God in his absolute power because it is best not to ignore him for your own benefit, because God is ‘still creating’ within the human individual who ‘detaches’ from the world and cultivates ‘the spark of God’ within. Eckhart’s historical context points to where his method arrived. This is further presented by Walter Senner’s class notes and a presentation in his lectio magistralis during May 2014, affirming Professor Senner as a respected medieval historian — From the fallen virgin to the immoveable stone: Divine omnipotence: oppression or liberation of humanity? The philosophical question from Peter Damian to Meister Eckhart.
Another text examined by Senner in his class on omnipotence and his lectio magistralis had long been published since the 1930’s but deemed ‘spurious’ by early Eckhart researchers, yet our dear professor along with Barbara Bartocci provided collective expertise to aid in its verification as authenticated in 2012 by Markus Vinzent at the Medieval conference at Leeds. This is found in the manuscript Codex Vaticanus Latinus 1086. A text where Eckhart presents ‘four disputed questions’. Moreover, this ‘treasure trove’ of a codex was the notebook originally in the possession of an Augustinian hermit named Prosper of Reggio Emilia. It contains Eckhart’s confirmed Parisian quaestiones III, IV & V which follow his famous quaestiones I & II found in another a single manuscript. Furthermore, quaestio IV provides an example how Eckhart understands Aristotelian physics and could provide the basis to reframe space and time closer to ‘the act of creation’ from the perfect ‘unmoved mover in act’ providing a fixed point for His immanence as the transcendent God’s presence found everywhere specifically in the motion and potentiality of creation.
The recently confirmed Quaestio VI is the first of four of the ‘ordinary disputations’ of the Parisian aula treating God’s absolute and ordained power. It provides an explicit statement to reconstruct a possible theory on how Eckhart made this distinction of God’s omnipotence, emphasized around the year 1300. In the quaestio there is a reference to d. 43, which implores: “An invective against those who say, that God can do nothing, but what He wills and does”. An examination from d. 43 reveals God’s absolute omnipotence over an ordained mode. ‘God can do anything that does not imply a contradiction’, such a statement claims that God could actually even ‘make something decent that was indecent’; this points to a discussion often included in comment on d. 44 concerning the redemption of Peter and the damnation of Judas. This certainly did not help Eckhart’s case for the antinomian tendencies it promoted among the other charges leveled against him at his trial in Cologne and later in Avignon. Eckhart’s ‘Theo-centric’ affirmation in human redemption cannot be denied.
These fragments from Troyes and the recently confirmed ‘newfound’ questions show congruence within Eckhart’s broader thought on omnipotence, man and creation which is found in detail in his commentaries on scripture beside the aforementioned comment on Exodus and the Gospel of John. His two comments on Genesis and the Wisdom of Solomon also contribute. What is evident from all these texts is the inextricable nature of God’s omnipotence bound to his ‘esse—existence—being’. There is also a sermon in his LW that is titled: Bene Omne Fecit: “Good is everything He made”, among others with a similar emphasis from his vernacular German sermons. This sermon partially presented in class is my translation project (§7).
The sermon highlights how Eckhart often took his highly dialectical metaphysical thought to the practical realm which argues against Kurt FLASCH’S thesis that a great divide exists between Eckhart’s LW and DW. This is overstated among other assessments from the accomplished German medieval historian. The renaming of Eckhart by Flasch as a ‘pure philosopher’ over the common label as ‘mystic’ is one which our Father Senner agrees needs a better definition, however, the ‘pure philosopher’ label seems contrived. Another is Flasch’s claim that Eckhart was strongly contra Thomas’s thought, again rhetorically overstated by Flasch. Senner reads Flasch as leaving many things unsaid about Eckhart’s intention as a theologian, rather focused on the exclusive intellectus of the creature as part of some early ‘enlightenment’ shift in the history of philosophy, an era ‘thinking about thinking’.Such ‘historicism’ is loaded with modern and contemporary German philosophical ‘baggage’ and in turn being ‘read back’ into a very different era, which is the very thing Flasch does with his ‘superior vista from today’ when criticizing those who would draw insight from the ‘shoulders of giants’ for our own ‘dis-enchanted’ world. Father Senner like all serious Christian historians of philosophy would apply Thomas’ thought in anticipating such existential reductionism. Namely, the project of Martin Heidegger selective use and redefining of scholastic treatments on ‘being’ from his perch of ‘self-enchanted’ rationality.
Eckhart’s posit of the intellectus over esse and ens takes precedence as explicated in his famous Parisian Quaestio I, where he asks if “being—esse” and the intellectus are the same in God? By affirming such a move based on his brother Thomas, Eckhart takes the simplicity of God, as foundational for constructing a very different metaphysical system as ‘beyond’ the one of the Aquinate. Eckhart’s system works off of his fellow Dominican and with all due respect, along with a more robust Neoplatonic synthesis. This seems to grant Eckhart license to ‘push such an envelope’. In quaestio I, there are two items of significance to note: Mainly, the intellectus is another dimension beyond or more fundamental than esse.
Here Eckhart utilizes a part of human cognition to show the equality of understanding and existence as the act of the ‘understanding in God’. Although expressed in a semi-apophatic sense, for God does not have a cognitive process as man, “God is intellectus”. This is brought forth in creation and His divine voluntas imbedded within the concept of the preeminence of the Dominican tradition adherence to the superior intellectus, a presupposition over the Franciscan school and Henry of Ghent where the voluntas was held supreme. What becomes evident is how Eckhart interprets the imago Dei as his understanding of intellectus.
Second, the emergence of the distinction of absolute and ordinary power in quaestio VI is certainly a theological question congruent with quaestio I, as the intellectus is absolute and ‘esse-existence being’ as ordinate, perhaps as a framework. Furthermore, it has an eventual anthropological application worked out elsewhere and in the fourth of this set of quaestiones disputate he presented in the Parisian aula in his second magisterium, known as quaestio IX. Here Eckhart asks: “is rational difference prior to real difference” as he answers ‘no’. A unique Christian Realism emerges from an empirical question embedded in his predominately rationalistic metaphysical thought which seems to track Thomas’ epistemology. Eckhart represents the individual human being as created with the potentia to know out of the actus rationis, in effect illustrating Eckhart’s active and passive possibility of intellectus worked out by the state of created freedom through the human voluntas or libero arbitrio. Where intellectus, in its absolute principle interacts with the res realis whereas the ratio rei, as the ordained or determinate. Here intentio as a mode in actu differs from the distinction of such ‘reasoning’ promoted by Henry of Ghent. Eckhart affirms Thomas’ distinctio realis. A major point where one would be on solid ground in following Thomas and where Eckhart departed from his direct mentor Theodoricus de Vriberch (Dietrich of Freiberg).
Obviously, humans as beings are by no means omnipotent, yet capable of potestas both ‘to do’ from ‘to be’ justice; the ‘both/and’ through an absolute and ordained mode where the possibility of ‘a just’ human is posited by Eckhart through the transcendental abstract justice. Eckhart concurs that the intellectus is the highest good and the human species’ possession reflects the imago Dei. Eckhart defines this like other scholastic authors as part of human cognition as ens rationis, but which is an accident of the human substance. It is ‘no-thing’ over the common designation ‘weak being’ as coined by Aristotle and developed further by Thomas.
The human person as a species seeks to cognoscere and intelligere and contains within his/her intellectus its authenticity and perfection in the divine. The human person is what he/she is through the lower ratio but based upon a ‘univocal’ intellectus which has a special status as relatio based from the human soul given ultimately from God. Furthermore like Aristotle, Eckhart says that all human persons, in accordance with their nature, are rational beings oriented towards knowledge. The fundamental ontological relationship between ‘the act of rational knowing and being for a human person’ explains why ‘all human persons naturally yearn for knowledge toward the outer act.’ Man, as God’s creation manifests both God’s absolute and ordained power analogically. Thus, a question arises, could ‘ordained’ apply to God’s intentio and ‘absolute’ to God’s successive redemption? Is Eckhart opening vistas of God’s operation both in accordance to his will (ordained) and man’s freedom (absolute)? For Eckhart, the knowable res (thing) ‘to be’ sensed in nature and ‘to be’ apprehend through the ratio, both contain the higher and lower — for all things (ens [or] esse hoc aut hoc) are of divine origin and a certain capacity but not ‘the Deity’. Eckhart in affirming God’s omnipotence goes to heart of the matter in an absolute sense, and beyond God’s ordinary power expressed in His creation; for God is eternal and dissimilar, certainly, but emphatically totally ‘other’ and beyond. Even to make what is indecent now decent.
So how can human potentiality accomplish a “better world”? Again, Eckhart does not allow the human species the preeminence. There is the creation of specifically explained metaphysical entities and hierarchies going along with the cosmology of the day. In his second commentary on Genesis which goes beyond the four types of interpretation methods of scripture towards the parable. Eckhart develops the aforementioned duplex esse from Albert the Great and the principium as rendered ‘beginning’ commonly read in Gen. 1 and from the Gospel of John 1:1. Eckhart posits the Latin as ‘principle’ rather than the traditional ‘In the beginning’ or a starting point. It is clear Eckhart has no interest in the later taken literally. What emerges is the ‘form’ as the plura of creation from its principium. Here the ratio idealis operates as the model from which God created the world. God ab aeterno is evidently ‘still creating’ from ‘principle’ and this is where Eckhart directs his comment on the foundational ‘In the Beginning’ passages from Scripture. For Eckhart, the perfection of created entities depend on its ‘form’ which is drawn from the unity of ‘one’ as the convertibility with esse and the cause of everything. As the creation is the receiver of God’s immanent presence, this is based upon a very different cosmology than one would conceive of from modern science and namely for a purpose in his preaching. Appropriately, Eckhart utilizes important concepts that would find a place in ‘better worlds’ discussions, namely the universe and its parts — substantial form over the ‘non being’ of accidents. This theme is developed in Expositio Sapientiae.
Alessandra BECCARISI’S introduction to this commentary provides a fair summation of such thought as it accomplishes its ‘bestowal’ on creation: Eckhart distinguishes between two senses of creation that together tend towards the total aim of creation, namely the being of the universe. God created in order that things should be, namely, should have being in the nature of things […] Two things: firstly, that the becoming of things, both natural and artificial (change, generation), depends on second causes (celestial intelligence, celestial movers, and celestial movements); and secondly, that the being of all things depends only and exclusively on God. Two considerations derive from this, […] : […] the duplex esse of created beings, namely, in the mind of God and outside of God. Creation corresponds only to the second moment, namely the collatio esse (bestowal of being): things (res), thought by God as rationes, are produced outside of him, created by him, precisely like an architect who realizes outside of himself the model he already has in mind.
In Eckhart’s ‘newfound’ quaestio VI on absolute or ordained power, Markus VINZENT affirms its parallel with his comment on Exodus which more fully develops God’s omnipotence as in the mind of God as ‘God’s knowledge’. “[…], the answer in the question does not refer to God’s will — as if God could do anything that he wishes to do — but to God’s being; he can do whatever is and can be, ‘because he can do anything that is possible”. This highlights the ‘essentialist agent theory’, yet raises many questions of how Eckhart actually understands human freedom in his emphatic affirmation. Therefore, the created human being as such and separated from its principle is a ‘pure nothing’ as he views the accident finding ‘being’ in the substance, at least as produced in the human intellectus related to God, yet being a power of the soul in its reciprocal relatio to God. For all its ‘being’, its ratio is the same as the principle which has produced it, just as the ‘concrete boat’ is nothing in comparison with the model that exists eternally and intellectually in the mind of its designer. Here Eckhart’s anthropological intentio encompasses a conflation with voluntas begun by Augustine. This uncovers where he metaphysically coined his famous concept of abgescheidenheit or ‘detachment’ which applies to ‘practical intentio’ and the voluntas but based upon the intellectus implying an ‘extra-practical intentio’.
This all arrives at Eckhart’s view of time and space. One that Markus VINZENT has also expounded as he examined the overlooked Quaestio III from Eckhart’s first Parisian Magisterium and affirmed the research of Niklaus LARGIER. A current researcher working with Vinzent, Shuhong ZHENG further elaborates this, Eckhart’s ‘time’ is a process of understanding within cognition:
Creation is the conferring of existence, which does not occur in time, even though it takes time for a thing to come into existence, which involves both matter and form. So the disparity between time and eternity as seen in Augustine is developed into a contrast between matter and form, becoming and informing, imperfection and perfection, division/number and unity/oneness.
This could be illustrated with the indifference Eckhart demonstrates the created human as intellectus as evident in the relation between a general term ‘justice’ and the particular term ‘just’, perhaps as a becoming and informing mode. In order to clarify the Gospel of John comment, Eckhart examines the ‘just’, or the ‘just man’, as a concrete entity, but still nothing in himself as this individual. As ‘just’, this individual has no value, no sense. This is rather derived from an ‘ontic’ relation with ‘transcendent justice’ itself and then only is ‘the just man as justice itself’. God’s ‘necessary entering into’ the human being is not to be understood in moral terms, but as a metaphysical necessity. Therefore, the intersection of time and space within the human individual provides ‘the Deity’ the place to bestow the ‘optimum’.
How Eckhart accomplishes this Markus VINZENT aptly states:
[…] The only principle that can perfect the heavens is the ‘superior’, the ultimate principle, the nature of which is nothing but to give ‘itself totally’, ‘in whichever way possible’, ‘in total and parts’. Eckhart even thinks in terms of time – as he adds that such giving ‘cannot be done in one go’, but that such infusion of divine perfection needs a process and takes place successively. The first principle, and therefore any principle, such as space, can therefore not be understood in a closed concept of place, as if the given place were there to be filled for its own sake (say a new building, for being embellished with furniture, pictures, silver and gold), but as ‘the eye does not see itself, but for the total [body], so does a place not serve for itself, but has to be there for the ‘totality’, namely for the ‘being (understood as becoming) of the universe or the conservation of the universe’. In this sense, Eckhart develops an ecological understanding of ‘space’, a pure dynamism that is directed toward spacial creation, its sustainability and the conversation in the broadest sense. Ekhart’s innovative reading of space and time is based on, yet only goes beyond, the notions that he found in his confrères Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The discussion arose from Aristotle’s Physics.
[…] The only principle that can perfect the heavens is the ‘superior’, the ultimate principle, the nature of which is nothing but to give ‘itself totally’, ‘in whichever way possible’, ‘in total and parts’. Eckhart even thinks in terms of time – as he adds that such giving ‘cannot be done in one go’, but that such infusion of divine perfection needs a process and takes place successively. The first principle, and therefore any principle, such as space, can therefore not be understood in a closed concept of place, as if the given place were there to be filled for its own sake (say a new building, for being embellished with furniture, pictures, silver and gold), but as ‘the eye does not see itself, but for the total [body], so does a place not serve for itself, but has to be there for the ‘totality’, namely for the ‘being (understood as becoming) of the universe or the conservation of the universe’. In this sense, Eckhart develops an ecological understanding of ‘space’, a pure dynamism that is directed toward spacial creation, its sustainability and the conversation in the broadest sense. Ekhart’s innovative reading of space and time is based on, yet only goes beyond, the notions that he found in his confrères Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The discussion arose from Aristotle’s Physics.
As all these Dominican Masters viewed ‘space and time’ as a receiving formal power, it was Eckhart who stood more firmly within the Neoplatonic principle of generation and without a ‘fixed location’ but upon a fixed understanding of an omnipotent God. Through his style of exposition, he uses, arguably, the most famous line of Augustine’s Confessionum: inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te . Motion needing a fixed point, here Eckhart affirms a terminus ad quem, and for a preacher, he ‘spoke God and his spark in the soul’ to men and women as in ‘potentiality or presentiality’. This is evidence how he perhaps over-applied his scholastic terminology in an exclusive manner, pointing to the problematic concerning his vernacular German sermons transference of his Latin concepts.
Perhaps, for Eckhart there could be ‘no better world’ as a result of preaching the gospel and its reception. He was, after all, of the Order of the Preachers. So as for this world “being made better” by redemption and reconciliation in Christ is the crux of the matter, “it is what it is”, because God ‘is in it’ by ‘who He is’ in His omnipotence. Eckhart never seems to deny the incarnation in space and time, this implicitly affirms a linear spacial and temporal view of redemptive history found in Divine Scripture that forms the traditional treatment of ‘Better Worlds’ discussions from traditional literal interpretive approaches. However, Eckhart did not strive to comment on Scripture through such an approach nor a historical–grammatical method. This method of interpretation was articulated later with the philological advancements Eckhart clearly helped enhance by the coining of various concepts in German. Nevertheless, Eckhart’s ‘collapsed immanence’ comes out consistently in his various sermon texts, be they in Latin or the vernacular.
Finally, I detect a major assumption Eckhart made concerning his various audiences from the monastery, the University of Paris or to the parishes ‘as being part of the faithful’. This relegated human sin to a default mode as a doctrinal point, simply preached against, and underdeveloped at least in a traditional Pauline - Augustinian manner that church history and the historical-grammatical method from my tradition emphasizes. Rather he treated sin from a metaphysical perspective where its ‘status’ as ‘privation’ reigns. Here Aristotle of all the auctoritates perhaps provided the closer definition ‘in missing the mark’ for Eckhart, notwithstanding, ideas already found in the thought of Origen while ignoring Augustine. Meister Eckhart’s metaphysical thought is unorthodox for the ‘nature—grace’ foundation of the Roman Church, and the Papal Bull of 1329 still stands. Nevertheless, the spiritual gleanings from Eckhart’s thought are received worldwide and of interest to many common people, beside the religious and secular scholars with whom Senner interacts and is recognized as an authority.
Father Senner, seeking to better understand his frater Teutonicus, provides precision. He is relentless on getting the facts straight about Eckhart and if there is a bias? This is understandable. Is Father Senner an apologist seeking Eckhart’s rehabilitation in the eyes of the Roman Church? It is clear from working with Father Walter over the last three years that the verdict is still out in view of such an ominous question. From the perspective of the historical realities, I doubt Eckhart can be rehabilitated and here perhaps differ with Father Senner, because I see the censure of his work as justified. However, I also question if ‘rehabilitation’ is ultimately Senner’s project? At least from what I have gathered. He is not working as a theologian by integrating Eckhart, nor from a deeper spiritual perspective, perhaps as Father Paul Murray OP. He is certainly intrigued and sensitive to Eckhart’s provocations. Rather, Senner is a meticulous historian of Medieval Philosophy and Theology. His observation: “that Eckhart could have been cleared in his trial if he held to ‘Dionysian participation’, but he ‘consciously’ did not”; here the “why he did not?” shows how an objective historian frames a question. I sense from such a statement and question a certain ambivalence on the part of Father Senner.
Probably, because the whole record as of now stands incomplete, notwithstanding the political context that Senner enjoys investigating. Therefore, he is consistently digging around the Vatican Archive perhaps for more evidence and new sources of information. What I detect from Senner is a normal adherence to Thomistic participation and his Catholic orthodoxy, yet a fascination with Meister Eckhart for the mystery that surrounds him and the challenging nature of the Parisian Master’s thought. This is my observation and will gladly stand corrected if this is to the contrary. The professor’s sharp mind is equitable in treating Eckhart and with the benefit of the doubt, his objective attitude is stronger than any perceived bias. Father Senner, my dear professor and mentor has emulated a ‘mind’ to pursue truth in Christian philosophy and his Catholic faith and religious vocation, and even the more demonstrates a ‘heart’ for all people and creation. Meister Eckhart would be proud of his fellow Dominican Meister and brother serving his Order as a professor and for the historical record at the Angelicum, further demonstrated by his many published works and his distinguished service for the Leonine Commission. The following sermon (§7) was translated according to the salient metaphysical points as only Eckhart could craft from Scripture and the auctoritates. There are omitted sections where Eckhart ends the sermon and preaches morality and the responsibility of human freedom which is a vital point throughout his sermons and emphasized by Walter Senner as presented in his class notes and for his Lectio Magisteralis.
SERMO XXVIII -- Bene Omne Fecit: Mark 7:31—37: And they were astonished beyond measure, saying, “He has done all things well. He even makes the deaf hear and the mute speak.” When men create, it usually works as three things that are to be lifted up or to be magnified. It is not easy to find a fourth, neither is it insignificant. The first is whether the work is part of his Being? second, if its responsible for or to Beauty? and third if it is wholly full, Integral. By the preceding words, the crowd marveled at the works of the Lord. Good, he says, has He made all things. He made things or his works as much as they pertain to being-existence Entitatem (hoc et hoc), Good so far as to his work of Beauty, All things so far as to his Integrity. From the Psalm: Magnificent are your works oh LORD. In wisdom you made all; and He made all things good, Deut. 32 Give the praise to our God, His Works are Perfect. They “ARE” (exist) so far as toward his work of BEING Entitatem (this or that being), Perfect in fullness so far as to integrity. God’s Work, His works are Perfect. For the (esse - existence) of single things are from God alone. John 1:3 ‘omnia per ipsum facta sunt’ All things made ‘exist’ through Him”), Which is, all that has become to exist, either through the way or nature or art, (exists through him). The (Esse-existence) and this only is the perfection of everything. Therefore, all the works of God are perfect. even more, and nothing that is called his work from another or is alongside God is in its fullness. Even more, every imperfect work of the creature insofar of these kinds. So as it is written in two ways: First ‘“as all God’s works are perfect,” or as “the works made perfect are God’s”. Thus, it is apt what is posited: “Give Praise (Magnify) our God.” Following: (esse - existence) is from God, as esse- existence is of the whole not the parts. But the whole and the perfect are the same. from the 3rd book of Aristotle’s’ Physics - James 1:17 Every good gift ‘is the best’ for . etc. said therefore, “He has made everything good”. Where the three are lifted up and magnified in the power of creation. He made: Wisdom in the distinction of things, “All things” and its goodness in its order: Good. […] Again, if God does everything, so that creatures were left on their own operations? And yet, as much directly from the simple things? Further, what is the cause of the distinction of things? Nothing, in fact, nothing makes a distinction, but everything goes well, for there is none. On the other hand, if he has done all things well, “From where, then, is the field, or the world that hath tares or weeds?” […] How can we be without Being? For Being or ‘to be’ is universally from God, as based on Job 10: “Your hands shaped me and others that follow. Any deeper and more accurately and more particularly to the work of this kind”. For example, it can certainly be done. That if it is not to be done, it neither acts to be done. […] To the second: this is not taken away nor is excluded by means of the operation of the others. For a person generates man and the sun. It should be noted that the whole of the causality of the cause is the cause of the whole of the thing caused, according to the manner of its own. Whence the Father is the begetter of the intellectual, the son of God in human affairs, no less than of the body is the cause of becoming to the soul, and with respect to a disposition to be made according to the mode of causality. Because otherwise they would not have begotten a man. They are as ‘produced things’ and are composite in the first cause in all things. Hence, according to this, it can be said that the soul is no less than the form of the intellectual soul arises from the propagation of his corporeal nature The third, scorning the many reports that say from the simple as to the just as one simple example, the whole universe voids many empty questions.For the fourth is shown through the same thing. The more perfect the form, the simpler its nature and more distinct and more beautiful in its virtue. For example, the form of Man. Therefore, the whole universe will be the. simplest in itself and most distinct in its parts. Therefore, this perfection and simplicity is the cause of the universe and is of the distinction of things.To the Fifth, say that God makes everything well, J. Sir. 39d: “All the good works of the LORD”. This is shown, before BEING and beyond BEING is nothing, neither is it good nor is it well. Again, both through BEING they are in BEING and are all well (made). But everything exists from God only from Him and immediately. Therefore, etc. For every creature has BEING from God either, BEING to another or Nothing. If there is nothing, then, God is not the cause of all things; if there is something other than his existence, God is the first cause, therefore, WE HAVE PURPOSE. Therefore, God alone can do all things: since he who gives BEING, He alone gives BEING to all things, because, if there is no giving, nothing is given. For something cannot be without BEING. It is clear, therefore, that He alone gives, who gives it through the consequence, though Himself, Moreover, only God can do everything, and again only he has made it well, namely, the first cause of the whole universe, John 1, all things made exist in Him given to us through Him. Furthermore, the last end of the whole universe, and again, the very fact that God makes anything, he makes it well and it is good. Look above to the best gift. […
1 ECKHART VON HOCHEIM, (Meister): Die lateinischen Werke, (here after ECKHART: LW) eds. Ernst BENZ, Karl CHRIST, Bruno DECKER, Herbert FISCHER, Bernhard GEYER, Joseph KOCH, Ernst SEEBERG, Loris STURLESE, Konrad WEISS, and Albert ZIMMERMANN, vols I–V, Stuttgart (1936–2015).
2 SENNER, Walter: Meister Eckhart’s life, training, career, and trial, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKETT, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500–1800, pp. 7‒84, here p. 41‒55.
3 ECKHART: Fratris Echardi Principium Collatio in Libro Sententiarium n° 1‒9, in: LW V, pp. 17‒26.
4 op. cit., p. 1.
5 BECCARISI, Alessandra: Eckhart’s Latin Works, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 –1800, 36), pp. 85‒123, here, pp. 86‒88: “Eckhart’s inaugural lecture comments on the verse of Siracides (Ecclesiasticus) 38:4: Altissimus creavit de terra medicinam [The Lord has created medicines from the earth]. Each word in this verse refers to a book of the Sentences: “Altissimus” refers to the first book, where God is considered from two aspects: in himself and with respect to the created beings. In accordance with this, there is a division into two books which corresponds, for the first book (dist. 1–35), to the theology of personal and essential property, and for the second part, to God as principle of power, knowledge, and will. The word “creavit” corresponds to the second book devoted to creation and the created. The expression “de terra” indicates the humanity of the Savior (book 2, dist. 1–23), considered from the point of view of humility. Finally, “medicinam” refers to book four. Dealing with the grace of justification, glory, and resurrection, it is subdivided into two parts: theology of the sacraments (book 4, dist. 1–43), followed by the theology of glory”.
6 ALBERTUS MAGNUS: S. theol. 1 tr. 3, q. 18, c.1.; Ed. Colon. XXXIV/1, pp. 87.85‒88.5: “Omne quod est in mundo, habet esse et quod hoc est. Ergo ab alio habet esse et quod hoc est. A causa autem determinata habet, quod hoc est; ergo non habet esse ab eadem; omnis causa secunda determinata est; ergo a nulla causarum secundarum habet esse, sed quod hoc est. Est autem aliqua causa eius quod est esse in entibus factis. Cum autem sit nisi causa prima vel secunda, oportet, quod esse causatum sit a causa prima in omnibus quae sunt. Causam autem primam vocamus deum”. Cf. also: De an. III tr. 2 c. 11; ed. Colon. VII/I. p. 192 1 f.: “ […] in omni quod est citra primum, est hoc et hoc.” De int. et int. I tr. 2 c. 1; Borgnet 9, 491b. — ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 52, in: LW III, p. 43.11: “Omne autem citra deum est ens hoc aut hoc, non autem ens aut esse absolute, sed hoc est solius primae causae, quae deus est”.
7 My translation with the aid of Walter Senner from the Latin “ambulabimus in nomine Domini Dei nostri in aeternum et ultra” as quoted by Eckhart LW II. p. 90.5. The full text in following is Eckhart’ final argument of nine where he seems to posit God totally beyond and quotes Thomas. This certainly affirms God’s transcendence. ECKHART: Expositio libri Exodi, on Exod. c.15.18, n° 86, in: LW II, here, pp. 89.4‒90.5: Ultimo breviter et plane, cum dicitur: dominus regnavit in aeternum et ultra, vult dicere quod ultra quam possit numerari aut cogitari semper in infinitum stabit regnum eius. Secundum quem Thomas optime dicit p. I q.14 a.20 quod cogitationes et affectiones cordium sunt infinitae et sciuntur a deo scientia visionis, quod multis obscurum est; nec memini me ab aliquo ante Thomam esse dictum. Sed nec ipsa Thomas alibi fortassis invenitur hoc sentisse de scientia visionis, sed tantum de scientia simplicis intelligentiae. Notavi de hoc plane et plenius in Opere quaestionum. Dicamus igitur quod cognovit dominus in aeternum, id est quantum in aeternum cogitari potest, scientia visionis, et ultra, quantum ad scientiam simplicis intellegentiae. Et sicut est de scientia dei, sic pari ratione est de regno ipsius et regimine, Mich.4 ‘ambulabimus in nomine domini dei nostri in aeternum et ultra’”.
8 ECKHART: Die deutschen Werke, (here after ECKHART: DW), eds. Josef QUINT and Georg STEER, vols. I–V, Stuttgart 1936–2007: DW 2:419.1–421.5: Translated into English from the middle high German as: [I]f a man turns away from self and all created things, then—to the extent that you do this, you will attain to oneness and blessedness in your soul’s spark, which time and place never touched. This spark is opposed to all creatures: it wants nothing but God, naked, just as He is. It is not satisfied with the Father or the Son or the Holy Ghost, or all three Persons so far as they preserve their several properties (eigenschaft). I declare in truth, this light would not be satisfied with the unity of the whole fertility of the divine nature. In fact I will say still more, which sounds even stranger: I declare in all truth, by the eternal and everlasting truth, that this light is not content with the simple, changeless divine being which neither gives nor takes: rather it seeks to know whence this being comes, it wants to get into its simple ground, into the silent desert into which no distinction ever peeped, of Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. In the inmost part, where none is at home, there that light finds satisfaction, and there it is more one than it is in itself: for this ground is a simple stillness, motionless in itself, and by this immobility all things are moved, and all those lives are conceived that live rationally in themselves. That we may live rationally in this sense, may the eternal truth of which I have spoken help us.
9 ECKHART: Acta Echardiana, LW V: p. 597.2-17: see Meister Eckhart Essential Sermons, Treatises, and Defense, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1981, (The Classics of Western Spirituality): abridged trans. of p. 77: “In agro domino (In the field of the Lord): In the field of the Lord over which we, though unworthy, are guardians and laborers by heavenly dispensation, we ought to exercise spiritual care so watchfully and prudently that if an enemy should ever sow tares over the seeds of truth (Mt. 13:28), they may be choked at the start before they grow up as weeds of an evil growth. Thus, with the destruction of the evil seed and the uprooting of the thorns of error, the good crop of Catholic truth may take firm root. We are indeed sad to report that in these days someone by the name of Eckhart from Germany, a doctor of sacred theology (as is said) and a professor of the Order of Preachers, wished to know more than he should, and not in accordance with sobriety and the measure of faith, because he turned his ear from the truth and followed fables. The man was led astray by the Father of Lies who often turns himself into an angel of light in order to replace the light of truth with a dark and gloomy cloud of the senses, and he sowed thorns and obstacles contrary to the very clear truth of faith in the field of the Church and worked to produce harmful thistles and poisonous thorn bushes. He presented many things as dogma that were designed to cloud the true faith in the hearts of many, things which he put forth especially before the uneducated crowd in his sermons and that he also admitted into his writings”. — see also SENNER, Walter: Meister Eckhart’s life, training, career, and trial, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500–1800, pp. 7–84, here p. 79 sq.
10 FLASCH, Kurt: Meister Eckhart, Philosopher of Christianity, (Translators: Anne SCHINDEL and Aaron VANIDES) New Haven 2015. Here, p. 264: “It bothered the censors that Eckhart mentioned the creation of the world in the same breath as the begetting of the divine verbum. The second of his incriminating articles stated that God begot the divine Son in the same now of eternity in which he created the world. They confronted Eckhart with the following: the begetting of the Son was an eternal process, the creation a temporal one, a creatio temporalis, as they said. The theologians did not reach a consensus regarding the eternity of the world in this case, but the examination resulted in the condemnation of the first three articles. Eckhart’s objection that God’s activity was his eternal essence and that the world as the content of ideas was identical to the eternal logos did not interest the judges. They had strict criteria for heresy. Claiming that the world was eternal was one of them”.
11 ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 184, p. 153.6; n° 278 p. 233.12; n° 280, p. 235.7; n° 371, p. 316.4; n° 573, p. 501.2; n° 603, p. 527.3; n° 672, p. 585.15.
12 SENNER, Walter: Transcription from Troyes for course notes on Divine Omnipotence. Spring semester 2014: Ms. Troyes 269, fol. 85 v marg. inf. -ekardus: Item quolibet creato nec producto aliud producendum est non ens etsi producatur habebit rationem entis. Sed potentia Dei se extendit super omne ens et super omne non ens, quia nec est ens neque non ens, quia homo non est non homo, et non homo non est homo. Queritur. Item cuilibet finito si addatur finitum totum erit finitum et nunquam infinitum. Sed omne creatum est finitum et omne creabile. Ergo etc. Immo ex hoc quod aliquid uadit in infinitum ex hoc sequitur quod nunquam erit actu infinitum, quia si esset infinitum, ulterius non procederet in infinitum. Item secundum Anselmum solus deus est quo maius cogitari non potest. Ergo omni creato dato maius cogitari potest. Sed deus potest plus facere quam aliqua creatura cogitare . Queritur etc.
13 ECKHART: German Sermon 29, DW II, p. 78.1-5 Meister Eckhart Teacher and preacher, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1986, p. 288 Now the masters say that the will is so free hat no one can force it but God alone. God does not force the will, but places it in freedom in such a way that it wills nothing but what God himself is and what freedom itself is. And the spirit can will nothing but what God wills. This is not a deficiency in freedom; it is true freedom.
14 KLIBANSKY, Raymond in: Magistri Eckardi Quaestiones Parisienses, ed. Antoine DONDAINE, in: Magistri Eckardi Opera latina, fasc. XIII, Lipsiae 1936, p. XXV sq., edition pp. 32‒43. — VINZENT, Markus: Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister Eckhart, in: The Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol. 63 (2012) pp. 156‒186. —BARTOCCI, Barbara & SENNER, Walter, Vat. Lat. 1086 autopsy.
15 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.lat.1086 — COURTENAY, William J.: Reflections on Vat. Lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher D. SCHABEL, Leiden 2017, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 – 1800, 7), pp. 345–358.
16 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, VI in: LW I,2, here, pp. 461‒462: Utrum omnipotentiam quae est in Deo debeat attendi secundum potentiam Absolutam vel secundum potentiam ordinatam”? Et videtur, quod secundum ordinatam, quia debet attendi secundum quod decet Deum facere, et secundum ea, que potest facere. Contra: Omnipotentia respicit omnia que non implicant contradictionem, et hec sunt plura quam ordinata. Hic primo ostenditur, quod potentia est in Deo. Nam potentia dicitur in ordine ad actum. Sed duplex est actus: scilicet primus, qui est forma, que respondet potentie passive, et operari, quod respondet potentia activa. Et hec est in Deo: tum quia, ubi est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca, ibi est potentia. Sed in Deo est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca: tum quia secundum Avicennam potentia primo inventa est in hominibus, quia habent vim vincendi. Sed Deus non potest pati ab aliquo, ergo maxime actus. Sed dices: quomodo ponitur ista potentia in Deo? Dicendum quod secundum quod invenitur in creaturis, amota imperfectione, ut est ultimum complementi. Item dico, quod ista potentia est una realiter, quia dicitur de omnibus singulariter. Item, essentia est principium emanationum omnium, et ipsa est una. Ergo et cetera. Secundo inquirendum quomodo debeat intelligi ista distinctio, scilicet potentia absoluta et ordinata. Nam quando attribuuntur Deo secundum se, talia pertinent ad potentiam absolutam. Sed quando sibi aliqua attribuuntur secundum comparationem ad rationem et sapientiam, sic pertinet ad potentiam ordinatam. Tunc tertio, ad questionem dicendum, quod Magister in Sententiis determinat auctoritatibus sanctorum; et videtur dicere quod attenditur utrumque. Quidam tamen dicunt, quod ex hoc est omnipotens, quia potest facere quidquid vult per se et a se. Contra. Hoc solum declarat modum potentie. Dico igitur, quod magis attenditur secundum potentiam absolutam, quia debet attendi secundum quod se potest extendere ad omnia que non implicant contradictionem, quia attenditur in ordine ad possibile. Item alias potentia Dei esset limitata, si secundum aliqua attenderetur. Item sicut scientia dicitur Dei omnia scientem, quia scit omnia, ita de potentia. Quare autem non dicitur omnia volentem? Responsio: Solum vult illa, ad que applicat suam scientiam vel potentiam. Et nota quod non dicitur omnipotens, quia in eo sit omnis potentia, sed quia potest facere omne possibile. Ad argumentum dicendum, quod Deus de potentia absoluta potest facere que nunc non sunt decentia. Si essent tamen facta, essent decentia et iusta. Sed dicis: „non potest nisi que previdit? “Dicendum quod, si referatur ad actum, scilicet‚ nisi’, tunc est vera, quia quidquid facit previdit. Sed si referatur ad potentiam, tunc est falsa. Sed dicis: „Augustinus in Enchiridio dicit, quod est omnipotens, quia ‚potest quicquid vult’, non quia potest omnia “Dicendum quod Augustinus ex hoc ‚vult’, quia inter‚omnia’ includuntur mala, que Deus non potest. Ideo sic loquitur.
17 FLASCH, Kurt: Meister Eckhart, Philosopher of Christianity, (Translators: Anne SCHINDEL and Aaron VANIDES) New Haven 2015, p. 270: “He teaches that the world is eternal, articles 1–3. He claims that part of the soul is uncreated, article 4. He says that God is not good, article 5. He explains that creatures are pure nothingness, article 6. He preaches that reviling God is just as good as praising him, articles 7–9. He deprives external actions of their moral quality, articles 10–13. He rejects the prayer of supplication and the striving for holiness, articles 14–16. He conceptualizes divine filiation as complete identity, articles 17–23. He denies the distinction and countability of the persons of the Trinity, articles 24 and 25. He misunderstands Christian love as the denial of every form of subordination and superordination, article 26. He rejects remorse, articles 27–28.”
18 Op. cit., here, p. 46: “These works often categorize Eckhart a priori as a mystic, either in the title or within the opening sentences. Others defined him through specific philosophical currents and called Eckhart ’s intellectual position “Aristotelian-Thomistic” or “Platonic”; they characterized him as an advocate or enemy of “scholasticism.” Many distinguished between scholasticism and mysticism, seeing scholasticism as an abstract art of concepts, and mysticism as intuitive or as immediate religious experience. Still others sought a reformer before the Reformation. All of them lacked access to the Latin manuscripts. To put it bluntly: what these scholars held in their hands was Eckhart’s Sunday output; what he did from Monday to Saturday was beyond their knowledge. It had consequences for their interpretations of Eckhart. Everyone ranged between certain alternatives: pantheism or theism, realism or idealism, loyalty or disloyalty to the church. But these decisions were impossible to make without Eckhart’s Latin works.”
19 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, I&2, in: LW V, pp. 37‒48: found in Avignon 1071; Quaestiones Parisienses, III, IV & V, in: LW V, pp. 55‒83 found in Vaticanus Latinus 1086 and also Quaestiones Parisienses, VI, VII, VIII, IX in Vat. Lat. 1086, in: LW 1,2, pp. 461– 469.
20 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, IV, in: LW V, here, pp. 72‒76: Utrum Aliquem Motum Esse Sine Termino Implicet Contradictionem? Videtur quod non, quia invenitur motus sine termino ut motus caeli. Contra: terminus motus est idem quod motus. Qui igitur negat terminum, negat motum. Dicendum quod implicat contradictionem, quia non contingit moveri, nisi contingat motum esse. Item esset potentia sine actu. Ad argumentum' de motu dicendum quod terminus, a quo motus caeli, abicitur. Ideo speculatio remanet de termino, in quo motus est et ad quem. Quantum ad terminum, in quo motus est, est subiectum motus, et hoc est primum mobile. Corpus igitur primum mobile est primum corpus, ratione qua primum corpus habet minus de potentia et per consequens minus de motu; in quantum est primum mobile, habet minimum de motu. Nam aliqua sunt, quae sunt perfectionis, quaedam imperfectionis; nam moveri dicit imperfectionem. Et ideo quanto aliquid magis perfectum, tanto minus de motu et de loco, et quia corpus caeleste est perfectum primo, ideo minime movetur et locatur, sed omnia movet et omnia locat; nam terra nihil locat, aqua vero plus, et sic ascendendo habet minimum de motu, quia habet solum motum localem, item solum ubi; nec est etiam ab alio in aliud nisi ratione. Item est unus motus, et movetur per partes, non per centrum; nam est primum mobile ab immobili quod est in ipso, quia hoc est perfectionis; ideo debet moveri in se, non in centro. Et si arguitur: partes habent esse in potentia, dicendum quod argumentum arguit oppositum. Nam eo ipso quod sunt in potentia, per eas movetur, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Nam causa mutabilitatis in omnibus et immutabilitatis est totum et pars; nam quae habent plenum esse, immobilia sunt, ut deus; sed omne habens partem de esse est mutabile. Et hoc dicit Thomas Quaestione de malo in articulo de daemonibus q. 2 in solutione cuiusdam argumenti. Et sic caelum movetur per partes, quia primum; ideo unus motus et uniformis, ex quo sequitur quod habet contrarium. Astrologi autem, quia invenerunt in caelo stellato difformitatem, ideo posuerunt quod non erat primum mobile. Terminus autem ad quem motus caeli quidem antiquitus dicebatur [quod] generatio et corruptio istorum inferiorum. Sed dicendum quod in motu suo hoc quaerit caelum quod quaerit materia. Quae quia non habet esse totum, sed partem, ideo quaerit omnes formas: sic quia caelum est quantum, habet partes, et quia non habet locum, quaerit eum: ideo movetur, ut accipiat ubi omnium partium secundum dextrum et sinistrum. Vel potest dici quod corpus caeli est supremum. Sed de natura superioris est influere ei dare esse, et de natura inferioris est quaerere esse; et de natura superioris est quod sit praesens omni inferiori et se toto et quolibet sui ipsi toto inferiori et cuilibet sui; et quia hoc non potest simul, ideo successive influit inferiori. Quis igitur est terminus suus? Dicendum quod non quaerit aliquid sibi, sicut nec oculus videt sibi, sed toti, quia habet esse propter totum et se toto fini. Igitur et terminus quem quaerit caelum in motu, est esse universi vel conservare universum.
21 HOFF, Johannes: The Analogical Turn: A Response by Johannes Hoff in: Syndicate a new Forum for theology, Vol. 2 (2015) pp. 2‒61, here, p. 45.
22 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, I, in: LW V, pp. 37‒48. — See also Master Eckhart: Parisian questions and prologues, trsl. Armand MAURER, (Toronto 1974), p. 13: In the introduction Maurer states: “Eckhart defends the position that in God existence and knowing are identical in reality and perhaps even in our thought about them (ratione). He takes the same stand in his commentaries on Scripture, though in these works he does not qualify it with the cautious ‘perhaps’. Verbally at least this contradicts Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in his Summa: In God to be and to know are one and the same thing, differing only in our manner of understanding them (secundum intelligentiae rationem). Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, STh Iª q. 26 a. 2. […] Eckhart does not seem pleased with the way of putting the matter [Thomas], for it appeared to him to compromise the divine unity. […] He agreed with Aquinas that we can form many concepts about God which are not synonymous in meaning, but he emphasized that this posits no distinction in God himself or even in our thought about him, […]”.
23 QUERO - SÁNCHEZ, Andrés: Non-Situated Being: On the Reality of Nothing in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, (Eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ), Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 143–166.
24 BANZHAF, Martin L: Meister Eckhart’s Parisian Quaestio IX: Is rational difference prior to real difference? Licenza Ciclo II, Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Urbe, Roma, Moderated by Rev. Prof. Dr. phil. Walter Senner OP.
26 ECKHART: Expositio libri Sapientiae, n° 209, in: LW II, here, p. 543.1-6: “sicut nullus potest esse iustus sine iustitia, sic nemo potest scire iustitiam nisi per iustitiam et in ipsa iustitia. Et sic universaliter unumquodque sicut habet esse per speciem suam solam in natura, puta homo humanitate, sic et cognoscitur unumquodque in sola specie sui ipsius in anima cognoscentis, puta, ut prius, homo sola humanitate cognoscitur”.
27 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesi, n° 202, in: LW I, here, p. 349. 6-9: “intellectus quem elargitus est deus Adam primo, ipse est postrema eius perfectio, quae fuit in Adam, antequam peccaret. Et ratione huius intellectus dictum est de eo quod creatus est ‘ad imaginem dei’, et mediante illo locutus est deus cum eo”.
28 THOMAS DE AQUINO: I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4., ed. MANDONNET, pp. 230 & 231: Initially Thomas posited that intentional forms do not have true being, in where he distinguishes normal accidents that have esse firmum in natura and intentions that non habent esse vere. – “Si autem loquitur subjecto respectu accidentum quae habent esse firmum in natura, et quae sunt accidentia individui; tunc est verum dictum suum etiam de forma simplici, cujus quidditas non componitur ex partibus. Sunt enim quaedam accidentia quae non habent esse vere, sed tantum sunt intentiones rerum naturalium[…]”.
29 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesis, n° 188, in: LW I, here, p. 332. 5-10: “Notandum autem secundo quod homo secundum speciem, qua homo est, ordinato proprie ad cognitionem, quae ordinato et perficitur proprie in ratione sive intelletto. Propter quod etiam sensus interiores, qui dirette ordinato et deserviunt intellectui, perfectiores sunt in homine qua in aliquo animali alio; secus de exterioribus sensibus. Et hoc est quod hic loquens de homine formato praemittit pulchrum visu et poterius dicit: et ad vescendum suave”.
28 ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 318, in: LW III, here, pp. 265 & 266.10-2: “Ratio est, quia superius ex sui natura et proprietate influit et se ipsum communicat suo inferiori et ipsi soli; vera autem humilitas est qua quis se toto subicitur soli deo. Secundo: homo ab intellectu et ratione homo est. Intellectus autem abstrahit ab hic et nunc et secundum genus suum nulli nihil habet commune, impermixtus est, separatus est, ex III De anima”.
23 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesi, n° 3, in: LW I, here, pp. 186.13–187.13: “De primo sciendum quod principium, in quo creavit deus caelum et terram, est ratio idealis. Et hoc est quod Ioh. 1 dicitur: 'in principio erat verbum' - Graecus habet logos, id est ratio 1 - et sequitur: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil'. Uniuscuiusque enim rei universaliter principium et radix est ratio ipsius rei. Hinc est quod Plato ponebat ideas sive rationes rerum principia omnium tam essendi quam sciendi. Hinc est et tertio quod commentator VII Metaphysicae dicit quod quiditas rei sensibilis semper fuit desiderata sciri ab antiquis, eo quod ipsa scita sciretur causa prima omnium. Vocat autem commentator primam causam non ipsum deum, ut plerique errantes putant, sed ipsam rerum quiditatem, quae ratio rerum est, quam diffinitio indicat, causam primam vocat. Haec enim ratio est rerum 'quod quid est' et omnium rei proprietatum 'propter quid est'. Est enim diffinitio et demonstratio sola positione differens, ut ait philosophus”
24 ECKHART: Liber parabolarum Genesis, n° 21‒26 in: LW I, here, pp. 491.8–496.13, here p. 496.9-13: “Hoc est ergo quod hic dicitur: creavit deus in principio caelum et terram, id est duo principia omnium entium creatorum, activum et passivum, caelum activum, terram passivum vocans. Sic ergo sub metaphora et parabolice sub nomine caeli et terrae innuitur natura et naturalis proprietas et numerus primorum principiorum totius creati universi”.
25 ECKHART: Expositio libri Sapientiae, LW II, pp. 301‒634.
26 BECCARISI, Alessandra: Eckhart’s Latin Works, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart,, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 –1800, 36), pp. 85‒123, here, pp. 101‒102.
27 VINZENT, Markus: Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister Eckhart, in: The Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol. 63 (2012) pp. 156‒186, here, p. 171. See ECKHART: Expositio libri Exodi n° 28 in: LW II, p. 32.9-12): omne agens potest naturaliter in omnia illa et sola illa per se, quae continentur sub forma, quae in ipso est principium actionis. Sed esse est principium omnis actionis divinae. Igitur deus potest omnia quae sunt et quae esse possunt.
28 CASTON, Victor: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality, in: Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik PERLER, Leiden 2001 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 76), pp. 23–48, here, p. 33: Caston maintains Augustine’s importance in the history of ‘extrapractical’ intentionality has been largely overlooked. He suspects this is because of Augustine’s association of intentio with the will (uoluntas). “Augustine makes intentio the centerpiece of his analysis of cognition in De Trinitate […] every act of vision, memory, and thought is said to involve intentio as an essential element. The theory accounts for content by appealing to this intentio, together with forms or species that are replicated at each successive stage of cognition”.
29 LARGIER, Niklaus: Time in the German Dominican School in: The Medieval Concept of Time: The Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pasquale PORRO, Leiden 2001, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 75), here, p. 236: “The intellect constitutes the essence of time, which is expressed in its definition, insofar as it determines the number of movement with regard to before and after” — VINZENT, Markus: Eckhart on Space and Time, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 49–63.
30 ZHENG, Shuhong: The ‘Now’ that Goes beyond Eternity, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 97–113, here: p. 102.
31 MCGINN, Bernard.: Meister Eckhart Essential Sermons, Treatises, and Defense. (Paulist Press, 1981): Trans. notes from p.126, “see note 20: “A remote source may be found in Augustine’s discussion of the just man in Trin.8.6, but the Meister’s development is highly original. The important principle “insofar as” (in quantum), indicating that the discussion is based on a limited, formal and abstract point of view, and was one of the key issues in Eckhart’s defense of his thought during the process against him.” McGinn has translated this on pp.72-73, Selection’s from Eckhart’s Defense.
32 VINZENT, Markus: Eckhart on Space and Time, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 49–63, here: pp. 58–59. Vinzent refers to Aristotle’s Physics VI, 6, 236b, 33. Vinzent also cites, Master Eckhart: Parisian questions and prologues, trsl. Armand MAURER, (Toronto 1974), pp. 24–25: here Thomas is cited from De potentia V. 5: “Motus enim ex ipsa sui ratione repugnant ne possit poni finis. Eo quod motus est in aliud tendens: unde non habet rationem finis, sed magis ejus quod est finem.” Vinzent also footnotes Albert’s comment on Aristotle’s Physics: “locus habet potentiam quandam formaliter complentem corpora quae moventur ad locum. Fertur enim unumquodque physicorum corporum in sui proprium et naturalem locum non prohibitum tamquam id quod est perfectio sua secundum formam. Et ideo quantum suscipit de forma a generante, tantum suspicit de loco eius. Et unum et idem generans dando ei formam dat ei etiam locum, in quo completur et salvatur forma illa”.
33 Op. cit., p. 62. — See also ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesis, n° 172, in: LW I, here, p. 317.1-10: “Rursus decimo tertio: res omnis locata ab alio extra locum suum inquieta est, locum sitit et in loco suo quiescit. Caelum autem non locatum ab alio, sed locus potius locans omnia. Ipsum in loco suo movetur, et motus suus vita est, et esse est sibi moveri; quod si non moveretur, non esset caelum. Dicens ergo deum quiescere in omni opere duo docet: primo, quod deus est, locus omnium, extra quem inquieta sunt omnia et in quo solo quiescunt omnia, secundum illud Augustini Confessionum I: » inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te «. Secundo docet: cum sit locus omnium, in se ipso operatur et movet omnia, et sibi operari - non operatum esse - est esse et vivere sibi et singulis omnibus, scilicet universo”.
34 ECKHART: German Sermon 29, DW II, p. 79.1- 9, Meister Eckhart Teacher and preacher, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1986: “Now some people say: ‘if I possess God and God’s love, I can do anything I want’. They do not understand these words correctly. As long as you can do anything against God and his commandments, you do not have the love of God, although you may fool the world (you would have it). The person who is established in God’s will and God’s love finds it delightful to do all the things that are pleasing to God and to avoid doing those that are against God. And it is just as impossible for him to avoid doing something God wants done as it is to do something against God. Just as impossible as it would be for someone to walk whose legs were bound, that is how impossible it is for a person who is in God’s will to do something against virtue”.
35 ECKHART: Magistri Echardi Sermones, sermo XXXVIII in: LW IV, p. 252.1-10: XXVIII DOMINICA DUODECIMA POST TRINITATEM DE
EVANGELIO (Marc. 7,31-37), Bene omnia fecit, Marci 7, Artifices operum quorumlibet ex tribus solent attolli sive magnificari,nec facile puto quartum posse inveniri nec pauciora sufficere. Primum est, si opus habeat suam entitatem, secundum, si debitam venustatem, tertium, si plenam integritatem. Ab his tribus magnificatur a turba dominus in verbis praemissis: Bene, inquit, omnia fecit. Fecit quantum ad rerum vel operum entitatem, bene quantum ad operum venustatem, omnia quantum ad eorum integritatem, Psalmus: 'magnificata sunt opera tua, domine, omnia in sapientia fecisti'; et omnia bene feci!, Deut. 32: 'date magnificentiam deo nostro. Dei perfecta sunt […].
36 Op. cit., here, p. 253.1-10: […] opera'. 'Sunt' quantum ad operum entitatem, 'perfecta' quantum ad ipsorum venustatem, 'opera' in plurali quantum ad integritatem. 'Dei', inquit, 'perfecta sunt opera'. Esse enim singulorum est a deo et ab ipso solo, Ioh. 1: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt', id est 'omnia facta' sive ab arte sive a natura 'per ipsum sunt'. Esse autem et hoc solum perfectio est omnium. Igitur omne opus dei perfectum est, et nihil sive nullum opus alicuius extra deum sive citra deum est perfectum, quin immo omne opus creaturae imperfectum est necessario, in quantum huiusmodi. Sic ergo ordinatur littera dupliciter: primo sic: 'dei opera sunt perfecta', vel sic: 'opera perfecta sunt dei'. Unde apte praemittitur: 'date magnificentiam deo nostro'
37 Op. cit., here, p. 253.11-14: Praeterea, esse a deo est; esse autem totius est, non partis. Sed »totum et perfectum idem«, III Physicorum 4. lac. 1: 'omne datum optimum' etc. Ait ergo: bene omnia fecit. Ubi tria in deo attollit et magnificat, potentiam creationis: fecit, sapientiam distinctionis: omnia, bonitatem ordinationis: bene.
38 Op. cit., here, pp. 256. 10-17–257.1-6: Rursus, si deus facit omnia, ideo res creatae destituuntur propriis operationibus? Adhuc autem, quomodo ab uno simplici sunt multa immediate? Rursus, si deus facit omnia, ideo res creatae destituuntur propriis operationibus? Adhuc autem, quomodo ab uno simplici sunt multa immediate? Praeterea, quae causa distinctionis rerum? Nihil enim nihil distinguit, sed omnia bene, nec est. Rursus, si omnia fecit bene, 'unde ergo' ager, mundus scilicet, 'habet zizania'? […] Quomodo enim fieri esset sine esse? Esse autem universaliter a deo est, et fieri in esse fundatur. Unde Iob 10: 'manus tuae fecerunt me' et cetera quae sequuntur. Intimius ergo et verius et immediatius operatur deus in huiusmodi. Fieri enim operatur utique per esse fieri. Quod si non sit fieri, nec agit fieri.
39 Op. cit., here, pp. 257.7–258.2: Ad secundum: per hoc non tollitur nec excluditur operatio aliorum. »Homo enim generat hominem et sol«. Ubi notandum quod omnis causa est causa totius causati secundum modum suae causalitatis. Unde pater generans filium in humanis est causa etiam animae intelledualis non minus quam corporis, dispositive tamen et quantum ad fieri secundum modum causalitatis. Aliter enim nec generaret hominem. Fiunt enim composita primo in omnibus. Unde secundum hoc potest dici quod amma intellectiva sit ex traduce non minus quam forma corporalis.
40 Op. cited, here, p. 258.3-10: Ad tertium spretis pluribus opinionibus dic quod ab uno simplici est unum tantum simplex, puta totum universum, per quod evacuantur plures vanae quaestiones. Ad quartum patet per idem. Quanto enim forma perfectior, tanto simplicior in sui natura et distinctior sive fecundior in virtute. Exemplum in forma hominis. Totum ergo universum in se simplicissimum erit et distinctissimum in partibus. Ipsa ergo perfectio et simplicitas esse universi causa est distinctionis rerum.
41 Op. cited, here, pp. 258.11–259.11: Ad quintum dic quod deus facit omnia bene, Eccli. 39: 'omnia opera domini bona'. Quod sic patet: ante esse et praeter esse nihil est, nec bonum est nec bene est. Iterum per esse et in esse sunt et bene sunt omnia. Sed omne esse a deo est, ab ipso solo et immediate. Ergo etc. Omnis enim creatura a deo habet esse aut aliud quam esse aut nihil. Si nihil, ergo deus non est causa omnium; si aliquid aliud quam esse, igitur deus non est prima causa; si esse, habemus propositum. Solus ergo deus facit : quia, qui dat esse, solus dat et omnia dat; quia, si esse non datur, nihil datur. Non enim potest aliquid esse sine esse. Patet ergo quod solus dat qui esse dat, et omnia dantur per consequens per ipsum. Item solus deus omnia facit, utpote causa prima universalis Ioh. 1: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt' et. Item solus bene facit, utpote finis universalis omnium. Et iterum, quia hoc ipso quod aliquid facit deus, bene facit et bonum est. Vide super datum optimum’.
1 ECKHART VON HOCHEIM, (Meister): Die lateinischen Werke, (here after ECKHART: LW) eds. Ernst BENZ, Karl CHRIST, Bruno DECKER, Herbert FISCHER, Bernhard GEYER, Joseph KOCH, Ernst SEEBERG, Loris STURLESE, Konrad WEISS, and Albert ZIMMERMANN, vols I–V, Stuttgart (1936–2015).
2 SENNER, Walter: Meister Eckhart’s life, training, career, and trial, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKETT, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500–1800, pp. 7‒84, here p. 41‒55.
3 ECKHART: Fratris Echardi Principium Collatio in Libro Sententiarium n° 1‒9, in: LW V, pp. 17‒26.
4 op. cit., p. 1.
5 BECCARISI, Alessandra: Eckhart’s Latin Works, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 –1800, 36), pp. 85‒123, here, pp. 86‒88: “Eckhart’s inaugural lecture comments on the verse of Siracides (Ecclesiasticus) 38:4: Altissimus creavit de terra medicinam [The Lord has created medicines from the earth]. Each word in this verse refers to a book of the Sentences: “Altissimus” refers to the first book, where God is considered from two aspects: in himself and with respect to the created beings. In accordance with this, there is a division into two books which corresponds, for the first book (dist. 1–35), to the theology of personal and essential property, and for the second part, to God as principle of power, knowledge, and will. The word “creavit” corresponds to the second book devoted to creation and the created. The expression “de terra” indicates the humanity of the Savior (book 2, dist. 1–23), considered from the point of view of humility. Finally, “medicinam” refers to book four. Dealing with the grace of justification, glory, and resurrection, it is subdivided into two parts: theology of the sacraments (book 4, dist. 1–43), followed by the theology of glory”.
6 ALBERTUS MAGNUS: S. theol. 1 tr. 3, q. 18, c.1.; Ed. Colon. XXXIV/1, pp. 87.85‒88.5: “Omne quod est in mundo, habet esse et quod hoc est. Ergo ab alio habet esse et quod hoc est. A causa autem determinata habet, quod hoc est; ergo non habet esse ab eadem; omnis causa secunda determinata est; ergo a nulla causarum secundarum habet esse, sed quod hoc est. Est autem aliqua causa eius quod est esse in entibus factis. Cum autem sit nisi causa prima vel secunda, oportet, quod esse causatum sit a causa prima in omnibus quae sunt. Causam autem primam vocamus deum”. Cf. also: De an. III tr. 2 c. 11; ed. Colon. VII/I. p. 192 1 f.: “ […] in omni quod est citra primum, est hoc et hoc.” De int. et int. I tr. 2 c. 1; Borgnet 9, 491b. — ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 52, in: LW III, p. 43.11: “Omne autem citra deum est ens hoc aut hoc, non autem ens aut esse absolute, sed hoc est solius primae causae, quae deus est”.
7 My translation with the aid of Walter Senner from the Latin “ambulabimus in nomine Domini Dei nostri in aeternum et ultra” as quoted by Eckhart LW II. p. 90.5. The full text in following is Eckhart’ final argument of nine where he seems to posit God totally beyond and quotes Thomas. This certainly affirms God’s transcendence. ECKHART: Expositio libri Exodi, on Exod. c.15.18, n° 86, in: LW II, here, pp. 89.4‒90.5: Ultimo breviter et plane, cum dicitur: dominus regnavit in aeternum et ultra, vult dicere quod ultra quam possit numerari aut cogitari semper in infinitum stabit regnum eius. Secundum quem Thomas optime dicit p. I q.14 a.20 quod cogitationes et affectiones cordium sunt infinitae et sciuntur a deo scientia visionis, quod multis obscurum est; nec memini me ab aliquo ante Thomam esse dictum. Sed nec ipsa Thomas alibi fortassis invenitur hoc sentisse de scientia visionis, sed tantum de scientia simplicis intelligentiae. Notavi de hoc plane et plenius in Opere quaestionum. Dicamus igitur quod cognovit dominus in aeternum, id est quantum in aeternum cogitari potest, scientia visionis, et ultra, quantum ad scientiam simplicis intellegentiae. Et sicut est de scientia dei, sic pari ratione est de regno ipsius et regimine, Mich.4 ‘ambulabimus in nomine domini dei nostri in aeternum et ultra’”.
8 ECKHART: Die deutschen Werke, (here after ECKHART: DW), eds. Josef QUINT and Georg STEER, vols. I–V, Stuttgart 1936–2007: DW 2:419.1–421.5: Translated into English from the middle high German as: [I]f a man turns away from self and all created things, then—to the extent that you do this, you will attain to oneness and blessedness in your soul’s spark, which time and place never touched. This spark is opposed to all creatures: it wants nothing but God, naked, just as He is. It is not satisfied with the Father or the Son or the Holy Ghost, or all three Persons so far as they preserve their several properties (eigenschaft). I declare in truth, this light would not be satisfied with the unity of the whole fertility of the divine nature. In fact I will say still more, which sounds even stranger: I declare in all truth, by the eternal and everlasting truth, that this light is not content with the simple, changeless divine being which neither gives nor takes: rather it seeks to know whence this being comes, it wants to get into its simple ground, into the silent desert into which no distinction ever peeped, of Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. In the inmost part, where none is at home, there that light finds satisfaction, and there it is more one than it is in itself: for this ground is a simple stillness, motionless in itself, and by this immobility all things are moved, and all those lives are conceived that live rationally in themselves. That we may live rationally in this sense, may the eternal truth of which I have spoken help us.
9 ECKHART: Acta Echardiana, LW V: p. 597.2-17: see Meister Eckhart Essential Sermons, Treatises, and Defense, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1981, (The Classics of Western Spirituality): abridged trans. of p. 77: “In agro domino (In the field of the Lord): In the field of the Lord over which we, though unworthy, are guardians and laborers by heavenly dispensation, we ought to exercise spiritual care so watchfully and prudently that if an enemy should ever sow tares over the seeds of truth (Mt. 13:28), they may be choked at the start before they grow up as weeds of an evil growth. Thus, with the destruction of the evil seed and the uprooting of the thorns of error, the good crop of Catholic truth may take firm root. We are indeed sad to report that in these days someone by the name of Eckhart from Germany, a doctor of sacred theology (as is said) and a professor of the Order of Preachers, wished to know more than he should, and not in accordance with sobriety and the measure of faith, because he turned his ear from the truth and followed fables. The man was led astray by the Father of Lies who often turns himself into an angel of light in order to replace the light of truth with a dark and gloomy cloud of the senses, and he sowed thorns and obstacles contrary to the very clear truth of faith in the field of the Church and worked to produce harmful thistles and poisonous thorn bushes. He presented many things as dogma that were designed to cloud the true faith in the hearts of many, things which he put forth especially before the uneducated crowd in his sermons and that he also admitted into his writings”. — see also SENNER, Walter: Meister Eckhart’s life, training, career, and trial, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500–1800, pp. 7–84, here p. 79 sq.
10 FLASCH, Kurt: Meister Eckhart, Philosopher of Christianity, (Translators: Anne SCHINDEL and Aaron VANIDES) New Haven 2015. Here, p. 264: “It bothered the censors that Eckhart mentioned the creation of the world in the same breath as the begetting of the divine verbum. The second of his incriminating articles stated that God begot the divine Son in the same now of eternity in which he created the world. They confronted Eckhart with the following: the begetting of the Son was an eternal process, the creation a temporal one, a creatio temporalis, as they said. The theologians did not reach a consensus regarding the eternity of the world in this case, but the examination resulted in the condemnation of the first three articles. Eckhart’s objection that God’s activity was his eternal essence and that the world as the content of ideas was identical to the eternal logos did not interest the judges. They had strict criteria for heresy. Claiming that the world was eternal was one of them”.
11 ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 184, p. 153.6; n° 278 p. 233.12; n° 280, p. 235.7; n° 371, p. 316.4; n° 573, p. 501.2; n° 603, p. 527.3; n° 672, p. 585.15.
12 SENNER, Walter: Transcription from Troyes for course notes on Divine Omnipotence. Spring semester 2014: Ms. Troyes 269, fol. 85 v marg. inf. -ekardus: Item quolibet creato nec producto aliud producendum est non ens etsi producatur habebit rationem entis. Sed potentia Dei se extendit super omne ens et super omne non ens, quia nec est ens neque non ens, quia homo non est non homo, et non homo non est homo. Queritur. Item cuilibet finito si addatur finitum totum erit finitum et nunquam infinitum. Sed omne creatum est finitum et omne creabile. Ergo etc. Immo ex hoc quod aliquid uadit in infinitum ex hoc sequitur quod nunquam erit actu infinitum, quia si esset infinitum, ulterius non procederet in infinitum. Item secundum Anselmum solus deus est quo maius cogitari non potest. Ergo omni creato dato maius cogitari potest. Sed deus potest plus facere quam aliqua creatura cogitare . Queritur etc.
13 ECKHART: German Sermon 29, DW II, p. 78.1-5 Meister Eckhart Teacher and preacher, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1986, p. 288 Now the masters say that the will is so free hat no one can force it but God alone. God does not force the will, but places it in freedom in such a way that it wills nothing but what God himself is and what freedom itself is. And the spirit can will nothing but what God wills. This is not a deficiency in freedom; it is true freedom.
14 KLIBANSKY, Raymond in: Magistri Eckardi Quaestiones Parisienses, ed. Antoine DONDAINE, in: Magistri Eckardi Opera latina, fasc. XIII, Lipsiae 1936, p. XXV sq., edition pp. 32‒43. — VINZENT, Markus: Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister Eckhart, in: The Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol. 63 (2012) pp. 156‒186. —BARTOCCI, Barbara & SENNER, Walter, Vat. Lat. 1086 autopsy.
15 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.lat.1086 — COURTENAY, William J.: Reflections on Vat. Lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher D. SCHABEL, Leiden 2017, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 – 1800, 7), pp. 345–358.
16 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, VI in: LW I,2, here, pp. 461‒462: Utrum omnipotentiam quae est in Deo debeat attendi secundum potentiam Absolutam vel secundum potentiam ordinatam”? Et videtur, quod secundum ordinatam, quia debet attendi secundum quod decet Deum facere, et secundum ea, que potest facere. Contra: Omnipotentia respicit omnia que non implicant contradictionem, et hec sunt plura quam ordinata. Hic primo ostenditur, quod potentia est in Deo. Nam potentia dicitur in ordine ad actum. Sed duplex est actus: scilicet primus, qui est forma, que respondet potentie passive, et operari, quod respondet potentia activa. Et hec est in Deo: tum quia, ubi est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca, ibi est potentia. Sed in Deo est operatio intrinseca et extrinseca: tum quia secundum Avicennam potentia primo inventa est in hominibus, quia habent vim vincendi. Sed Deus non potest pati ab aliquo, ergo maxime actus. Sed dices: quomodo ponitur ista potentia in Deo? Dicendum quod secundum quod invenitur in creaturis, amota imperfectione, ut est ultimum complementi. Item dico, quod ista potentia est una realiter, quia dicitur de omnibus singulariter. Item, essentia est principium emanationum omnium, et ipsa est una. Ergo et cetera. Secundo inquirendum quomodo debeat intelligi ista distinctio, scilicet potentia absoluta et ordinata. Nam quando attribuuntur Deo secundum se, talia pertinent ad potentiam absolutam. Sed quando sibi aliqua attribuuntur secundum comparationem ad rationem et sapientiam, sic pertinet ad potentiam ordinatam. Tunc tertio, ad questionem dicendum, quod Magister in Sententiis determinat auctoritatibus sanctorum; et videtur dicere quod attenditur utrumque. Quidam tamen dicunt, quod ex hoc est omnipotens, quia potest facere quidquid vult per se et a se. Contra. Hoc solum declarat modum potentie. Dico igitur, quod magis attenditur secundum potentiam absolutam, quia debet attendi secundum quod se potest extendere ad omnia que non implicant contradictionem, quia attenditur in ordine ad possibile. Item alias potentia Dei esset limitata, si secundum aliqua attenderetur. Item sicut scientia dicitur Dei omnia scientem, quia scit omnia, ita de potentia. Quare autem non dicitur omnia volentem? Responsio: Solum vult illa, ad que applicat suam scientiam vel potentiam. Et nota quod non dicitur omnipotens, quia in eo sit omnis potentia, sed quia potest facere omne possibile. Ad argumentum dicendum, quod Deus de potentia absoluta potest facere que nunc non sunt decentia. Si essent tamen facta, essent decentia et iusta. Sed dicis: „non potest nisi que previdit? “Dicendum quod, si referatur ad actum, scilicet‚ nisi’, tunc est vera, quia quidquid facit previdit. Sed si referatur ad potentiam, tunc est falsa. Sed dicis: „Augustinus in Enchiridio dicit, quod est omnipotens, quia ‚potest quicquid vult’, non quia potest omnia “Dicendum quod Augustinus ex hoc ‚vult’, quia inter‚omnia’ includuntur mala, que Deus non potest. Ideo sic loquitur.
17 FLASCH, Kurt: Meister Eckhart, Philosopher of Christianity, (Translators: Anne SCHINDEL and Aaron VANIDES) New Haven 2015, p. 270: “He teaches that the world is eternal, articles 1–3. He claims that part of the soul is uncreated, article 4. He says that God is not good, article 5. He explains that creatures are pure nothingness, article 6. He preaches that reviling God is just as good as praising him, articles 7–9. He deprives external actions of their moral quality, articles 10–13. He rejects the prayer of supplication and the striving for holiness, articles 14–16. He conceptualizes divine filiation as complete identity, articles 17–23. He denies the distinction and countability of the persons of the Trinity, articles 24 and 25. He misunderstands Christian love as the denial of every form of subordination and superordination, article 26. He rejects remorse, articles 27–28.”
18 Op. cit., here, p. 46: “These works often categorize Eckhart a priori as a mystic, either in the title or within the opening sentences. Others defined him through specific philosophical currents and called Eckhart ’s intellectual position “Aristotelian-Thomistic” or “Platonic”; they characterized him as an advocate or enemy of “scholasticism.” Many distinguished between scholasticism and mysticism, seeing scholasticism as an abstract art of concepts, and mysticism as intuitive or as immediate religious experience. Still others sought a reformer before the Reformation. All of them lacked access to the Latin manuscripts. To put it bluntly: what these scholars held in their hands was Eckhart’s Sunday output; what he did from Monday to Saturday was beyond their knowledge. It had consequences for their interpretations of Eckhart. Everyone ranged between certain alternatives: pantheism or theism, realism or idealism, loyalty or disloyalty to the church. But these decisions were impossible to make without Eckhart’s Latin works.”
19 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, I&2, in: LW V, pp. 37‒48: found in Avignon 1071; Quaestiones Parisienses, III, IV & V, in: LW V, pp. 55‒83 found in Vaticanus Latinus 1086 and also Quaestiones Parisienses, VI, VII, VIII, IX in Vat. Lat. 1086, in: LW 1,2, pp. 461– 469.
20 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, IV, in: LW V, here, pp. 72‒76: Utrum Aliquem Motum Esse Sine Termino Implicet Contradictionem? Videtur quod non, quia invenitur motus sine termino ut motus caeli. Contra: terminus motus est idem quod motus. Qui igitur negat terminum, negat motum. Dicendum quod implicat contradictionem, quia non contingit moveri, nisi contingat motum esse. Item esset potentia sine actu. Ad argumentum' de motu dicendum quod terminus, a quo motus caeli, abicitur. Ideo speculatio remanet de termino, in quo motus est et ad quem. Quantum ad terminum, in quo motus est, est subiectum motus, et hoc est primum mobile. Corpus igitur primum mobile est primum corpus, ratione qua primum corpus habet minus de potentia et per consequens minus de motu; in quantum est primum mobile, habet minimum de motu. Nam aliqua sunt, quae sunt perfectionis, quaedam imperfectionis; nam moveri dicit imperfectionem. Et ideo quanto aliquid magis perfectum, tanto minus de motu et de loco, et quia corpus caeleste est perfectum primo, ideo minime movetur et locatur, sed omnia movet et omnia locat; nam terra nihil locat, aqua vero plus, et sic ascendendo habet minimum de motu, quia habet solum motum localem, item solum ubi; nec est etiam ab alio in aliud nisi ratione. Item est unus motus, et movetur per partes, non per centrum; nam est primum mobile ab immobili quod est in ipso, quia hoc est perfectionis; ideo debet moveri in se, non in centro. Et si arguitur: partes habent esse in potentia, dicendum quod argumentum arguit oppositum. Nam eo ipso quod sunt in potentia, per eas movetur, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Nam causa mutabilitatis in omnibus et immutabilitatis est totum et pars; nam quae habent plenum esse, immobilia sunt, ut deus; sed omne habens partem de esse est mutabile. Et hoc dicit Thomas Quaestione de malo in articulo de daemonibus q. 2 in solutione cuiusdam argumenti. Et sic caelum movetur per partes, quia primum; ideo unus motus et uniformis, ex quo sequitur quod habet contrarium. Astrologi autem, quia invenerunt in caelo stellato difformitatem, ideo posuerunt quod non erat primum mobile. Terminus autem ad quem motus caeli quidem antiquitus dicebatur [quod] generatio et corruptio istorum inferiorum. Sed dicendum quod in motu suo hoc quaerit caelum quod quaerit materia. Quae quia non habet esse totum, sed partem, ideo quaerit omnes formas: sic quia caelum est quantum, habet partes, et quia non habet locum, quaerit eum: ideo movetur, ut accipiat ubi omnium partium secundum dextrum et sinistrum. Vel potest dici quod corpus caeli est supremum. Sed de natura superioris est influere ei dare esse, et de natura inferioris est quaerere esse; et de natura superioris est quod sit praesens omni inferiori et se toto et quolibet sui ipsi toto inferiori et cuilibet sui; et quia hoc non potest simul, ideo successive influit inferiori. Quis igitur est terminus suus? Dicendum quod non quaerit aliquid sibi, sicut nec oculus videt sibi, sed toti, quia habet esse propter totum et se toto fini. Igitur et terminus quem quaerit caelum in motu, est esse universi vel conservare universum.
21 HOFF, Johannes: The Analogical Turn: A Response by Johannes Hoff in: Syndicate a new Forum for theology, Vol. 2 (2015) pp. 2‒61, here, p. 45.
22 ECKHART: Quaestiones Parisienses, I, in: LW V, pp. 37‒48. — See also Master Eckhart: Parisian questions and prologues, trsl. Armand MAURER, (Toronto 1974), p. 13: In the introduction Maurer states: “Eckhart defends the position that in God existence and knowing are identical in reality and perhaps even in our thought about them (ratione). He takes the same stand in his commentaries on Scripture, though in these works he does not qualify it with the cautious ‘perhaps’. Verbally at least this contradicts Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in his Summa: In God to be and to know are one and the same thing, differing only in our manner of understanding them (secundum intelligentiae rationem). Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, STh Iª q. 26 a. 2. […] Eckhart does not seem pleased with the way of putting the matter [Thomas], for it appeared to him to compromise the divine unity. […] He agreed with Aquinas that we can form many concepts about God which are not synonymous in meaning, but he emphasized that this posits no distinction in God himself or even in our thought about him, […]”.
23 QUERO - SÁNCHEZ, Andrés: Non-Situated Being: On the Reality of Nothing in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, (Eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ), Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 143–166.
24 BANZHAF, Martin L: Meister Eckhart’s Parisian Quaestio IX: Is rational difference prior to real difference? Licenza Ciclo II, Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Urbe, Roma, Moderated by Rev. Prof. Dr. phil. Walter Senner OP.
26 ECKHART: Expositio libri Sapientiae, n° 209, in: LW II, here, p. 543.1-6: “sicut nullus potest esse iustus sine iustitia, sic nemo potest scire iustitiam nisi per iustitiam et in ipsa iustitia. Et sic universaliter unumquodque sicut habet esse per speciem suam solam in natura, puta homo humanitate, sic et cognoscitur unumquodque in sola specie sui ipsius in anima cognoscentis, puta, ut prius, homo sola humanitate cognoscitur”.
27 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesi, n° 202, in: LW I, here, p. 349. 6-9: “intellectus quem elargitus est deus Adam primo, ipse est postrema eius perfectio, quae fuit in Adam, antequam peccaret. Et ratione huius intellectus dictum est de eo quod creatus est ‘ad imaginem dei’, et mediante illo locutus est deus cum eo”.
28 THOMAS DE AQUINO: I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4., ed. MANDONNET, pp. 230 & 231: Initially Thomas posited that intentional forms do not have true being, in where he distinguishes normal accidents that have esse firmum in natura and intentions that non habent esse vere. – “Si autem loquitur subjecto respectu accidentum quae habent esse firmum in natura, et quae sunt accidentia individui; tunc est verum dictum suum etiam de forma simplici, cujus quidditas non componitur ex partibus. Sunt enim quaedam accidentia quae non habent esse vere, sed tantum sunt intentiones rerum naturalium[…]”.
29 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesis, n° 188, in: LW I, here, p. 332. 5-10: “Notandum autem secundo quod homo secundum speciem, qua homo est, ordinato proprie ad cognitionem, quae ordinato et perficitur proprie in ratione sive intelletto. Propter quod etiam sensus interiores, qui dirette ordinato et deserviunt intellectui, perfectiores sunt in homine qua in aliquo animali alio; secus de exterioribus sensibus. Et hoc est quod hic loquens de homine formato praemittit pulchrum visu et poterius dicit: et ad vescendum suave”.
28 ECKHART: Expositio s. evangelii sec. Iohannem, n° 318, in: LW III, here, pp. 265 & 266.10-2: “Ratio est, quia superius ex sui natura et proprietate influit et se ipsum communicat suo inferiori et ipsi soli; vera autem humilitas est qua quis se toto subicitur soli deo. Secundo: homo ab intellectu et ratione homo est. Intellectus autem abstrahit ab hic et nunc et secundum genus suum nulli nihil habet commune, impermixtus est, separatus est, ex III De anima”.
23 ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesi, n° 3, in: LW I, here, pp. 186.13–187.13: “De primo sciendum quod principium, in quo creavit deus caelum et terram, est ratio idealis. Et hoc est quod Ioh. 1 dicitur: 'in principio erat verbum' - Graecus habet logos, id est ratio 1 - et sequitur: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil'. Uniuscuiusque enim rei universaliter principium et radix est ratio ipsius rei. Hinc est quod Plato ponebat ideas sive rationes rerum principia omnium tam essendi quam sciendi. Hinc est et tertio quod commentator VII Metaphysicae dicit quod quiditas rei sensibilis semper fuit desiderata sciri ab antiquis, eo quod ipsa scita sciretur causa prima omnium. Vocat autem commentator primam causam non ipsum deum, ut plerique errantes putant, sed ipsam rerum quiditatem, quae ratio rerum est, quam diffinitio indicat, causam primam vocat. Haec enim ratio est rerum 'quod quid est' et omnium rei proprietatum 'propter quid est'. Est enim diffinitio et demonstratio sola positione differens, ut ait philosophus”
24 ECKHART: Liber parabolarum Genesis, n° 21‒26 in: LW I, here, pp. 491.8–496.13, here p. 496.9-13: “Hoc est ergo quod hic dicitur: creavit deus in principio caelum et terram, id est duo principia omnium entium creatorum, activum et passivum, caelum activum, terram passivum vocans. Sic ergo sub metaphora et parabolice sub nomine caeli et terrae innuitur natura et naturalis proprietas et numerus primorum principiorum totius creati universi”.
25 ECKHART: Expositio libri Sapientiae, LW II, pp. 301‒634.
26 BECCARISI, Alessandra: Eckhart’s Latin Works, in: A Companion to Meister Eckhart,, ed. Jeremiah HACKET, Leiden 2013, (Brill’s companions to the Christian tradition 500 –1800, 36), pp. 85‒123, here, pp. 101‒102.
27 VINZENT, Markus: Questions on the Attributes (of God): Four Rediscovered Parisian Questions of Meister Eckhart, in: The Journal of Theological Studies, NS, Vol. 63 (2012) pp. 156‒186, here, p. 171. See ECKHART: Expositio libri Exodi n° 28 in: LW II, p. 32.9-12): omne agens potest naturaliter in omnia illa et sola illa per se, quae continentur sub forma, quae in ipso est principium actionis. Sed esse est principium omnis actionis divinae. Igitur deus potest omnia quae sunt et quae esse possunt.
28 CASTON, Victor: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality, in: Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik PERLER, Leiden 2001 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 76), pp. 23–48, here, p. 33: Caston maintains Augustine’s importance in the history of ‘extrapractical’ intentionality has been largely overlooked. He suspects this is because of Augustine’s association of intentio with the will (uoluntas). “Augustine makes intentio the centerpiece of his analysis of cognition in De Trinitate […] every act of vision, memory, and thought is said to involve intentio as an essential element. The theory accounts for content by appealing to this intentio, together with forms or species that are replicated at each successive stage of cognition”.
29 LARGIER, Niklaus: Time in the German Dominican School in: The Medieval Concept of Time: The Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pasquale PORRO, Leiden 2001, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 75), here, p. 236: “The intellect constitutes the essence of time, which is expressed in its definition, insofar as it determines the number of movement with regard to before and after” — VINZENT, Markus: Eckhart on Space and Time, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 49–63.
30 ZHENG, Shuhong: The ‘Now’ that Goes beyond Eternity, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 97–113, here: p. 102.
31 MCGINN, Bernard.: Meister Eckhart Essential Sermons, Treatises, and Defense. (Paulist Press, 1981): Trans. notes from p.126, “see note 20: “A remote source may be found in Augustine’s discussion of the just man in Trin.8.6, but the Meister’s development is highly original. The important principle “insofar as” (in quantum), indicating that the discussion is based on a limited, formal and abstract point of view, and was one of the key issues in Eckhart’s defense of his thought during the process against him.” McGinn has translated this on pp.72-73, Selection’s from Eckhart’s Defense.
32 VINZENT, Markus: Eckhart on Space and Time, in: Performing Bodies: Time and Space in Meister Eckhart and Taery Kim, eds. Jutta VINZENT & Chris WOJTULEWICZ, Leuven 2016, (Eckhart Texts and Studies vol. 6), pp. 49–63, here: pp. 58–59. Vinzent refers to Aristotle’s Physics VI, 6, 236b, 33. Vinzent also cites, Master Eckhart: Parisian questions and prologues, trsl. Armand MAURER, (Toronto 1974), pp. 24–25: here Thomas is cited from De potentia V. 5: “Motus enim ex ipsa sui ratione repugnant ne possit poni finis. Eo quod motus est in aliud tendens: unde non habet rationem finis, sed magis ejus quod est finem.” Vinzent also footnotes Albert’s comment on Aristotle’s Physics: “locus habet potentiam quandam formaliter complentem corpora quae moventur ad locum. Fertur enim unumquodque physicorum corporum in sui proprium et naturalem locum non prohibitum tamquam id quod est perfectio sua secundum formam. Et ideo quantum suscipit de forma a generante, tantum suspicit de loco eius. Et unum et idem generans dando ei formam dat ei etiam locum, in quo completur et salvatur forma illa”.
33 Op. cit., p. 62. — See also ECKHART: Expositio libri Genesis, n° 172, in: LW I, here, p. 317.1-10: “Rursus decimo tertio: res omnis locata ab alio extra locum suum inquieta est, locum sitit et in loco suo quiescit. Caelum autem non locatum ab alio, sed locus potius locans omnia. Ipsum in loco suo movetur, et motus suus vita est, et esse est sibi moveri; quod si non moveretur, non esset caelum. Dicens ergo deum quiescere in omni opere duo docet: primo, quod deus est, locus omnium, extra quem inquieta sunt omnia et in quo solo quiescunt omnia, secundum illud Augustini Confessionum I: » inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te «. Secundo docet: cum sit locus omnium, in se ipso operatur et movet omnia, et sibi operari - non operatum esse - est esse et vivere sibi et singulis omnibus, scilicet universo”.
34 ECKHART: German Sermon 29, DW II, p. 79.1- 9, Meister Eckhart Teacher and preacher, ed. Bernard MCGINN, Mahwah 1986: “Now some people say: ‘if I possess God and God’s love, I can do anything I want’. They do not understand these words correctly. As long as you can do anything against God and his commandments, you do not have the love of God, although you may fool the world (you would have it). The person who is established in God’s will and God’s love finds it delightful to do all the things that are pleasing to God and to avoid doing those that are against God. And it is just as impossible for him to avoid doing something God wants done as it is to do something against God. Just as impossible as it would be for someone to walk whose legs were bound, that is how impossible it is for a person who is in God’s will to do something against virtue”.
35 ECKHART: Magistri Echardi Sermones, sermo XXXVIII in: LW IV, p. 252.1-10: XXVIII DOMINICA DUODECIMA POST TRINITATEM DE
EVANGELIO (Marc. 7,31-37), Bene omnia fecit, Marci 7, Artifices operum quorumlibet ex tribus solent attolli sive magnificari,nec facile puto quartum posse inveniri nec pauciora sufficere. Primum est, si opus habeat suam entitatem, secundum, si debitam venustatem, tertium, si plenam integritatem. Ab his tribus magnificatur a turba dominus in verbis praemissis: Bene, inquit, omnia fecit. Fecit quantum ad rerum vel operum entitatem, bene quantum ad operum venustatem, omnia quantum ad eorum integritatem, Psalmus: 'magnificata sunt opera tua, domine, omnia in sapientia fecisti'; et omnia bene feci!, Deut. 32: 'date magnificentiam deo nostro. Dei perfecta sunt […].
36 Op. cit., here, p. 253.1-10: […] opera'. 'Sunt' quantum ad operum entitatem, 'perfecta' quantum ad ipsorum venustatem, 'opera' in plurali quantum ad integritatem. 'Dei', inquit, 'perfecta sunt opera'. Esse enim singulorum est a deo et ab ipso solo, Ioh. 1: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt', id est 'omnia facta' sive ab arte sive a natura 'per ipsum sunt'. Esse autem et hoc solum perfectio est omnium. Igitur omne opus dei perfectum est, et nihil sive nullum opus alicuius extra deum sive citra deum est perfectum, quin immo omne opus creaturae imperfectum est necessario, in quantum huiusmodi. Sic ergo ordinatur littera dupliciter: primo sic: 'dei opera sunt perfecta', vel sic: 'opera perfecta sunt dei'. Unde apte praemittitur: 'date magnificentiam deo nostro'
37 Op. cit., here, p. 253.11-14: Praeterea, esse a deo est; esse autem totius est, non partis. Sed »totum et perfectum idem«, III Physicorum 4. lac. 1: 'omne datum optimum' etc. Ait ergo: bene omnia fecit. Ubi tria in deo attollit et magnificat, potentiam creationis: fecit, sapientiam distinctionis: omnia, bonitatem ordinationis: bene.
38 Op. cit., here, pp. 256. 10-17–257.1-6: Rursus, si deus facit omnia, ideo res creatae destituuntur propriis operationibus? Adhuc autem, quomodo ab uno simplici sunt multa immediate? Rursus, si deus facit omnia, ideo res creatae destituuntur propriis operationibus? Adhuc autem, quomodo ab uno simplici sunt multa immediate? Praeterea, quae causa distinctionis rerum? Nihil enim nihil distinguit, sed omnia bene, nec est. Rursus, si omnia fecit bene, 'unde ergo' ager, mundus scilicet, 'habet zizania'? […] Quomodo enim fieri esset sine esse? Esse autem universaliter a deo est, et fieri in esse fundatur. Unde Iob 10: 'manus tuae fecerunt me' et cetera quae sequuntur. Intimius ergo et verius et immediatius operatur deus in huiusmodi. Fieri enim operatur utique per esse fieri. Quod si non sit fieri, nec agit fieri.
39 Op. cit., here, pp. 257.7–258.2: Ad secundum: per hoc non tollitur nec excluditur operatio aliorum. »Homo enim generat hominem et sol«. Ubi notandum quod omnis causa est causa totius causati secundum modum suae causalitatis. Unde pater generans filium in humanis est causa etiam animae intelledualis non minus quam corporis, dispositive tamen et quantum ad fieri secundum modum causalitatis. Aliter enim nec generaret hominem. Fiunt enim composita primo in omnibus. Unde secundum hoc potest dici quod amma intellectiva sit ex traduce non minus quam forma corporalis.
40 Op. cited, here, p. 258.3-10: Ad tertium spretis pluribus opinionibus dic quod ab uno simplici est unum tantum simplex, puta totum universum, per quod evacuantur plures vanae quaestiones. Ad quartum patet per idem. Quanto enim forma perfectior, tanto simplicior in sui natura et distinctior sive fecundior in virtute. Exemplum in forma hominis. Totum ergo universum in se simplicissimum erit et distinctissimum in partibus. Ipsa ergo perfectio et simplicitas esse universi causa est distinctionis rerum.
41 Op. cited, here, pp. 258.11–259.11: Ad quintum dic quod deus facit omnia bene, Eccli. 39: 'omnia opera domini bona'. Quod sic patet: ante esse et praeter esse nihil est, nec bonum est nec bene est. Iterum per esse et in esse sunt et bene sunt omnia. Sed omne esse a deo est, ab ipso solo et immediate. Ergo etc. Omnis enim creatura a deo habet esse aut aliud quam esse aut nihil. Si nihil, ergo deus non est causa omnium; si aliquid aliud quam esse, igitur deus non est prima causa; si esse, habemus propositum. Solus ergo deus facit : quia, qui dat esse, solus dat et omnia dat; quia, si esse non datur, nihil datur. Non enim potest aliquid esse sine esse. Patet ergo quod solus dat qui esse dat, et omnia dantur per consequens per ipsum. Item solus deus omnia facit, utpote causa prima universalis Ioh. 1: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt' et. Item solus bene facit, utpote finis universalis omnium. Et iterum, quia hoc ipso quod aliquid facit deus, bene facit et bonum est. Vide super datum optimum’.
