Charles Taylor is a Canadian philosopher committed to hermeneutic phenomenology. Trained in analytical philosophy, he pulls together these differing 20th-century philosophical schools. Out of this background and as a Roman Catholic, he weaves a complex exploration of how Christian Western Civilization created modernity. Through placing the conditions of belief within the natural philosophical investigation, he presents intertwined theories upon today’s humanism. Here, he defines the concepts of 'the self' and 'the secular,' were “the fruit of devotion and faith” eventually escaped from traditional belief. Taylor’s theological exploration sketches a history of religious ideas, yet his treatment of theological concepts tends toward their manifestation as an “event.” The following reflects through various philosophical disciplines touched upon in Taylor’s Marianist Award lecture A Catholic Modernity?, plus two articles from his Philosophical Papers: Human Agency and Language, where the phenomena of language are posited as an object by locating its operation in the modern subject.
Taylor posits our perception of reality through language, and forges his hermeneutic between designative and expressivist dimensions, preferring the expressivist. Beginning a multi-century and layered journey, Taylor highlights the medieval natural world constituted as a cosmos functioning semiotically as a sign that pointed beyond itself. Here society was understood as something grounded in a higher reality, an enchanted world where everybody believed in God. This theologically saturated medieval world, witnessed the rise of nominalism, where signifying names became mere words rather than having a universally understood expression. This challenged the Christianized Aristotelian notion of human nature, eventually transforming the good of the human being determined by its ends or telos. While God the Creator created this telos or nature, once established, the constituted parameters became an effect, enabling the human substance to achieve their own (good) end that required God to “conform” along the lines of this good/ telos. The rupture occurred through later thinkers of the medieval era who presented it as unacceptable to limit God’s sovereignty by such parameters. They posited, God must always remain free to determine what is good. So to preserve God’s sovereignty, one would jettison essences as independent natures through words designated by language. According to Taylor, such an event and its contingency upon dependent created agents elicited a new relationship to “these things” or words void of the essence, not in terms of the normative patterns language reveals, but in terms of the signifying element. Therefore, “these things” found themselves in a modern age where they began to serve the extrinsic in relation to themselves by directly employing an instrumental reason found within the “self.” As Taylor states, “now this theory gives language a crucial role.” So ontologically, the analogical use of language turns toward a univocal direction, indeed, but Taylor is not content with simple explanations nor believes in single causes.
Furthering the fallout from such a metaphysical shift denying final causality, Taylor presents an eclipse of the telos for things or their nature. This he insists remains within a kind of meta-language laced humanism. Combined with modernity’s “mechanistic” universe, he emphasizes efficient causality with a truncated limited essence. Here the scientific method became a way of divining the efficient causes of things, not by discerning essence but by empirical observation of patterns in a phenomenological sense as expressed in language. The result, as we end up in late modernity, is nothing short of a new understanding of “being” liberated and gradually devoid of the onto-theological tradition, since all extrinsic final purposes are now expelled, they depend on natural, efficient causation alone. Of course, Taylor does not express it so directly but standing true within two traditions, he is working between the expressivist interest in human nature with an “autonomization.” Or some descriptive possibility without losing transcendence. This begins his commitment to “absolute truth” in maintaining a significant divergence from his hermeneutic phenomenological alignments. Moreover, as the real ontological divergence of all these experiences first became the Cartesian mind in the modern era, disengagement transpired and Taylor astutely traces this effect on metaphysics.
He states, “We are not in any sense forced to abandon the metaphysical stance in favor of objective accounts…. The task is now to give an objective account of depth structures…" .
Perhaps it is that in modern mass societies, we feel less of a sense that the factors which are decisive for our behavior… Why do we understand ourselves so readily in the of depth-psychological terms? Something fundamental about the whole development of modern society is waiting here to be uncovered.” The depth structure of community use of language combined with the late-modern understanding of “being” provides a collective sense of mystery in this discovery, yet this process from Descartes to the 20th century is by no means direct. Taylor’s explanation seeks to “uncover” Heidegger’s “let things be” which disengages further and empowers the German Philosopher’s linguistic turn in “Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch,” Here Taylor steps into Heidegger’s “Language as sovereign” and man encompassed in an embodied immanence - or transcendence? Still, Taylor’s traditional stance works within the ontic logos woven from the Augustinian tradition, where his intent transmits a more modified tone. A self- expressive flourishing operates consistent with the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Moreover, utilizing bifurcations and dichotomies in order to bring across his synthesis out of his dialectic, Taylor’s traditional complexity ironically risks oversimplification. This is evident when he treats theological concepts.
On a more critical note, Taylor’s account concerning nature/ grace relation lacks theological nuance. Moreover, “being” a neo-Aristotelian, Taylor’s Catholic “expression” encourages a language-centered “flourishing” to demonstrate this creation. Here a redefined “human being” emerges and where Taylor’s humanistic hermeneutical approach “flourishes” philosophically rather than theologically. By focusing on the reform movements as “events.” Coming out of the Middle Ages, either Catholic or the Reformation and examining ideas and concepts, his view on “renunciation” across certain religions opens up vistas but also stubborn caricatures. Sweeping implications that the Protestant Reformation opened the door to what would become exclusive humanism is evident. Such direction lacks development and portrays an “event,” which seems extracted philosophically in the tone of a philosophy of history. Thus, if modernity’s laced humanism produced such a direction and accuses the religious of his view of renunciation, then, we could ask, did this also provoke later Roman Catholic recalibrations and restatements such as Vatican II? What is lacking, therefore, is in viewing these “events” as theologically perpetual. Modernity’s theological roots are subtly interwoven throughout Western thought and continue their expression in pockets within Christianity. Taylor should be keen on this since his gospel of renewal seeks such an outlet, but “events” have a power all their own, and Taylor does not seem to consider explanations of gospel ubiquity in a spiritual sense. Nevertheless, his juxtaposition of “flourishing” and “renunciation” extracts peculiar insights and seeks to grapple with today’s spiritual expressions.
To a Christian, this outlook seems stifling. Do we really have to pay this price—a kind of spiritual lobotomy—to enjoy modern freedom? Well, no one can deny that religion generates dangerous passions, but that is far from being the whole story. Exclusive humanism also carries great dangers, which remain very underexplored in modern thought.
Taylor’s flourishing continues an Aristotelian one, but it could highlight a tension between creaturely goods and eternal goods through a Thomistic reading. Confusion exists between the order of creation and the order of redemption — between nature and grace. In the Reformed tradition, a fundamental continuity between nature and grace would be emphasized, namely between creation and redemption, even if recovery could be and one day “will be more” than natural creation. So whatever “ascetic” disciplines are required of us in renunciations, either Catholic or Protestant. These are not denials or repressions of flourishing but rather constraints and channels for our flourishing according to church and scripture’s authority rather than renunciations.
On the other hand, in appreciation of Taylor’s simple juxtaposition, the dichotomy of “heaven” and the importance of “this life ”often rings dissonant throughout Christian expressions of the gospel. One finds a new emphasis on “the goodness of creation” and the importance of social justice in line with his long-standing attempt at political expression. This is commendable and becomes a strength in Taylor’s presentation of belief. However, nature/grace theme within Catholic theological debate tends toward such difficulties, and Taylor has not eluded something trivial but engaged through a complex area within anthropological theology.
For Taylor, the anthropological exemplifies the self-centered shift of language and links directly within the ontological, epistemological, and ethical analysis. Here the realm of significance within the material universe and the natural world not only lost the transcendent but invoked human flourishing’s confused state where language provoked “flourishing and renunciation” yet driven by a disengagement from the enchanted Christian worldview. Indeed, his anthropologically nuanced approach grants a more central role to Romanticism as a turning point over the Enlightenment, but also as an “immanent redemption.” Romanticism’s significance could also show the populist spirituality that emerges in modern belief. Considering the central role of art and one of the features of post-Romantic art, he suggests a fundamental shift from art as mimesis to art as poises, from art imitating nature to art-making its world. This was necessary precisely because the secular flattening of the modern world meant the loss of reference. So in poetry, for instance, where previous poetic language could rely on metaphysical orders of meaning, now must consist of language articulating sensibility, and this can only end up as Heidegger did as he turned “being” anthropocentric. This commitment to his interpretative tradition confines his anthropology. Taylor seems to allow modernity’s plot to develop by dealing with so many sources that it eclipses the reality of human sin. His resistance to producing “perverse anthropomorphisms” still holds a form of anthropocentricity rather than the theocentric vista a Catholic philosophy should.
For Taylor when we reflect on our perception and acquisition of knowledge, Descartes, Locke, and Hume demonstrate what was there all along through the deconstruction of Heidegger et al. Taylor sets into motion a lengthy analysis through the modern age that formed into its mature version in Sources of Self and A Secular Age. He places the blame of sin more on reason where the philosophical accounts of modernity tending toward an epistemological fixation seize upon the Enlightenment as the center of the story, and this sin manifests itself by being embedded in propositions and truth structures. Furthermore, his desire to connect the transcendent with the immanent resonates. The result is a compelling theory establishing modernity by positing the primacy of the individual as a neutral intra-mental locus of certainty. However, this also demonstrates an absurdity; if knowledge knows something “outside” my mind, the transcendent would seem to be as far away as one could get. Any expectation of making contact with truth or God seems implausible unless its manifestation is personally known and acknowledged through revelation. Still, Taylor’s commitment to his interpretative tradition hides any transcendent anthropological epistemology, either by the impenetrable Kantian noumena or and in another direction dispersing it with the Hegelian Geist.
Nevertheless, this counter-Enlightenment narrative bears much fruit, as Taylor states: A one-word lexicon is an impossibility, as Herder and Wittgenstein have both argued. It is language that enables us to draw boundaries, to pick some things out in contrast to others. Through language, we formulate things, and thus come to have an articulated view of the world.
Taylor could very easily be misunderstood in being anti-reason, but it is essential to see where he is going with his view of modernity. Taylor's critique of Enlightenment epistemology goes beyond just language’s process in truth discovery and construction. Standing firmly behind this is both Heidegger and his french disciples and the rejection of foundationalism and correspondence theories of truth containing an initially valid, yet, possibly distortive use of language. In the Secular Age, he coins a concept called “closed world system” to better develop such modern epistemological confinements. Taylor’s hermeneutic pushes all boundaries (Nietzsche) and in one way, demonstrates his own boldness as a Christian thinker, yet not without the risk of acquiescence to the very trap of such a system.
Leaving no stone unturned, he states: On the perspective I'm developing here, no position can be set aside as merely devoid of insight. We could think of modern culture as the scene of a three-cornered, perhaps ultimately a four-cornered battle.
Taylor later admits he has complicated the matter, but he is already well-traveled and must stay the course. This demonstrates the tedious nature of his pedagogical method, and he must concede that “those” (neo-Nietzscheans of his tradition) have cut themselves off from any visibility of transcendence in its real sense. Taylor’s commitment to truth is tenacious, yet at times overshadowed by his many perspectives out of which he works. The “immanent frame” seems a lonely place, but here is where, according to Taylor, we must act ethically and with personal and political responsibility. Civility has its epistemological foundations, even if it has been forgotten.
The Nietzschean critique of modernity strikes much closer to home in an ethical sense. Here Taylor’s language fueled epistemological theory merges with a moral valuation where an ethic of independence, self-control, and self-responsibility persist. Where, disengagement provides the ability to resist conformity to authority and the unreflective consolation of an enchanted world. Ethics from such a vantage point demands courage, but the truth is stubborn. Taylor seems to be suggesting that we are the recipients of our own self-fulfilling prophecies, deciding beforehand that exclusive humanism sets the conditions for our moral life. We may have thereby shut down our openness for transcendent transformation. With this in mind, his treatment of Nietzsche as the “immanent revolt” makes much more sense. Here the “immanent counter-Enlightenment” that turns against the values of the Enlightenment’s secular versions of a Christian inheritance works a certain “romance.” Not only does Nietzsche’s critique expose the futility of exclusive humanism that secularized caritas, but it also admits that according to Taylor, secularism is here to stay, and it “works” for modern society through its own efficient causality, however most importantly for Taylor, we must reign over it.
Taylor’s descriptive journey is a massive achievement. However, his commitment to the hermeneutic tradition may limit possibilities for precise prescriptions helping cure this “malaise of modernity.” Still, his pursuit of living in this (secular) world but not be “of it” is a crucial assignment for any believer. Belief is a gift, and those who possess and practice it toward a transcendent reality in this seductive modern age of the self and the secular should not be ashamed, at least in keeping in step with Taylor’s natural philosophical vista. In the case of nature, all creatures have an identity in God's address to all his. By speaking, God brought his creatures into existence. Such a valid address means that creatures from this perspective do not have their identity only in a centered substance that persists over time. Still, in God's address, that narrates man into existence and fuels this existence. God has created human beings in his own objective image to act as beings he responsibly addresses and has mediated the world, making it knowable through language and its reality. Yet not so much comprehensible as mere “representation” through language, but through the potential to become profoundly intimate and mutually affirming as God’s image-bearers. Reality becomes present to humans in, under, and through language and Taylor’s erudite “expression,” and pursuit of this actual undergirding reality is to be commended.
[1] A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture, with responses by William M. Shea, Rosemary Luling Haughton, George Marsden, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, James L. Heft, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999)
[2] Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Section III PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: Chapter 9. Language and human nature; Chapter; 10. Theories of meaning
[3] Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1: Chapter; 10. Theories of meaning
[4] A Catholic Modernity?
[5] Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). ; A Secular Age. (Cambridge: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).
[6] Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1: chapter 9. Language and human nature
[7] ibid
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